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Abstract
Objective: Goal linking is the tendency to link achievement or failure of low level goals (e.g.
weight loss) with achievement or failure of higher level goals (e.g. happiness). This study-
explored whether people with major depression respond to daily hassles with rumination, as a
function of their tendency to goal link, as previously observed by Mcintosh and Martin (1992,
1995) in students with lower mood.
Design/ Method: A between subjects design facilitated assessment of goal linking,
rumination, daily hassles and life events, using self-report measures in interview, with 22
adults with major depression, compared with samples of 25 adults with other psychological
difficulties and 23 adults with no depression history.
Results: Participants with major depression reported significantly greater rumination, goal
linking and daily hassles than both comparison groups, and greater impact ofmore major life
events, than never depressed controls. Rumination was found to be more strongly related to
group differences in major depression than goal linking.
Conclusions: Primary findings support some role for goal linking in depressive rumination.
However, while participants with major depression responded to daily hassles with
rumination, it was not as a function of their tendency to goal link. Results tentatively suggest
that linking is a consequence of rumination rather than a cause.
vn
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Rumination and Depression
1.1.1 Definitions ofdepression
Depression is a very widespread condition that causes significant suffering and undermines
people's quality of life. Though variable, estimates of the incidence of depression suggest that
15-20% of adults experience significant symptoms of depression at any one point and that
depression occurs more frequently among women than men; a ratio of 2:1 in western societies
(Fennell, 2003). The onset and course of depression has been related to a wide range of
interacting factors that include: the psychological, environmental, historical and biological
(Fennell, 2003).
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV-TR;
American Psychiatric Association, 2000) is one of the standard systems that provide
classifications of clinical depression. DSM-IV-TR provides definitions for a number of
categories of depression including major depressive disorder and dysthymic disorder. Major
depressive disorder is characterised by depressed mood (chronic sadness) and/or loss of
interest or pleasure in most previously enjoyed activities (anhedonia). These features are
accompanied by a range of possible difficulties including disturbed weight or appetite,
disrupted sleep, psychomotor agitation or retardation, loss of energy, feelings of guilt or
worthlessness, difficulty thinking or concentrating and thoughts of death or suicide. To meet
the criteria for major depression, five or more of the symptoms must have been present most
of the day for at least two weeks and at least one of the symptoms must be either depressed
mood or loss of interest or pleasure. In addition the symptoms must cause clinically
significant distress or interfere with social, occupational or other functioning. Further, the
difficulties should not be better explained by bereavement or substance use (e.g. abuse of
drugs or medication) or a medical condition (e.g. hypothyroidism). Dysthymic disorder is
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characterised by milder but chronic symptoms that have been present for at least two years
and cause significant distress. While standardized definitions of depression cannot capture the
subtleties of each individual's experience, they provide a useful, pragmatic starting point.
1.1.2 Definitions ofrumination
Papageorgiou and Wells (2004) highlight that over the past 15 years there has been increasing
interest in empirical research and theories of rumination, in an effort to increase understanding
of the mechanisms of onset, maintenance and recurrence of depression.
In very general terms, rumination is consistently referred to as some form of persistent,
recursive thinking. Often rumination is discussed as a common response to negative mood
and a salient feature of major depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Papageorgiou & Wells,
2004). Different theoretical orientations, however, define rumination somewhat differently
and definitions vary in scope and in the extent to which rumination is viewed as automatic
versus controllable and maladaptive versus serving some function. These differences have led
to some uncertainty regarding definition and assessment of rumination within the literature
(Matthews & Wells 2004). Significant contributions to the literature on rumination have been
provided by a range of theories including:-
1. The Response Styles Theory ofDepression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991)
2. The Self-Regulatory Executive Function model (S-REF: Wells & Matthews, 1994, 1996)
3. The Goal Progress Theory of Rumination (Martin & Tesser, 1989; Martin, Tesser &
Mcintosh, 1993)
4. The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems Model (ICS: Teasdale & Barnard, 1993)
5. The Self-regulatory Model ofDepression (Pyszcynski & Greenberg 1987).
It is beyond the scope of this paper to review each theory in detail. For clarity, details of each
model will be described as the issues relating to each are discussed. Given the centrality of
The Goal Progress Theory to this study, this theory will be reviewed in greater detail when
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discussing goal linking (part 1.2). In many respects the theories are complementary (Brotman
& Derubeis, 2004); however a number of distinctions in definitions can be made.
The Response Styles Theoiy of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) defines rumination as
repetitive and passive thinking about symptoms of depression and the possible causes or
consequences of these symptoms. Thus rumination involves:-
"Repeatedly focusing on the fact that one is depressed: on one's symptoms of depression: and
on the causes, meanings and consequences of depressive symptoms" (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991,
p569)
Examples of ruminative thoughts include repeatedly thinking "what's wrong with me? Why
can't I get going? My mood is so bad". This definition is one of the most focused as it refers
only to responses to depressed or negative mood. The Response Styles Theory suggests that
people differ in their tendency to ruminate and that ruminating in response to negative mood
exacerbates and prolongs symptoms and increases depression. Rumination is viewed as the
less adaptive response to negative affect; the more adaptive alternatives being engaging in
distraction or using active problem solving strategies. The theory views rumination as
predominantly unhelpful to individuals and in describing peoples' responses to low mood it
implies that rumination is to some extent controllable.
Matthews & Wells (2004) discuss rumination in the broader context of their self-regulatory
model of depression (S-REF Wells & Matthews, 1994, 1996). The S-REF model is a detailed
information processing model ofgeneral emotional and cognitive dysfunction.
In brief, the model suggests that information is processed at three levels. First, incoming
stimuli are processed automatically by lower level processing networks. Secondly a
supervisory executive system operates to detect and resolve discrepancies between current and
desired states. This is achieved by appraising incoming stimuli and executing coping
strategies to resolve discrepancies. Thirdly, appraisal and coping depend on interactions with
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the third self-knowledge level. This self-knowledge level includes beliefs about the self,
coping plans and importantly meta-cognitive beliefs. Meta-cognitive beliefs include beliefs
about rumination which can either be positive or negative; a positive meta-cognitive belief
could be "I need to ruminate in order to understand my depression" and a negative meta-
cognitive belief could be "ruminating is uncontrollable and will make me lose my mind".
In S-REF the authors define rumination as repetitive thoughts that occur in an attempt to
resolve a discrepancy between desired state (e.g. positive view of self) and information that is
being processed about the self (e.g. the thought "1 am not coping"). They view rumination as
a coping mechanism, driven by beliefs about rumination (one type of meta-cognition, for
example "ruminating will help me resolve this issue"), but one that interferes with adaptive
coping (e.g. problem solving) and emotional processing. Like Nolen-Hoeksema, the authors
argue that rumination is a dysfunctional process. The S-REF model also accommodates
findings that those who ruminate often have positive beliefs about ruminating, as also found
by Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993). Wells and Matthews, however, define
rumination as relating to a variety of emotional disorders and not predominantly to depression.
Further the S-REF model suggests both mechanisms that are automatic (at lower level
processing networks) and controlled (at supervisory executive level and self knowledge level)
influence rumination.
Martin & Tesser (1989, 1996) have put forward a relatively broad definition of rumination as:
any recurring set of thoughts that revolve around a common theme. More specifically, from a
goal progress theoiy perspective (Martin & Tesser, 1989, Martin et al., 1993), the authors
view rumination as the tendency to think about unattained goals. They suggest that when
people do not receive clear feedback that they are making progress towards their goals, they
engage in mental activities intended to assist them to make progress (e.g. formulating
alternative paths to the goal). The authors acknowledge that while rumination does not
always help a person to progress with their goals, that is the intended function.
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This study examines rumination in the context of depression and goals. Thus an appropriate
definition would draw on the work of Nolen-Hoeksema and Martin, Tesser & Mcintosh, 1993.
Rumination could thus be conceptualized as mentally replaying or focusing on negative
thoughts and feelings, their causes and consequences, in response to the occurrence of a
stressful event including depressed mood and negative affect (Mcintosh et al., 1995; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991).
1.1.3 Distinguishing rumination from relatedpsychological constructs
Rumination has been shown to demonstrate similarities with a number of related cognitive
constructs, including negative automatic thoughts, worry and private self-consciousness;
however there are also important differences that distinguish rumination highlighted by
Nolen-Hoeksema 2004 and Papageorgiou & Wells 2004.
Beck (1967; 1976) describes negative automatic thoughts, typical in depression, as
characterised by themes of past personal loss or failure. Papageorgiou and Wells (2001a)
argue that negative automatic thoughts are comparatively brief appraisals of loss and failure in
depression compared with the repetitive, re-cyclic, chains of negative thought experienced as
rumination. Negative automatic thoughts could therefore represent the content or a snapshot
of rumination, while rumination describes the process of re-cyclic thought. Importantly a
number of studies evidence that rumination predicts depression over and above its shared
variance with different types of negative cognitions, for example dysfunction attitudes (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Parker & Larson, 1994; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001).
While substantial correlations have been found between rumination and worry (Segerstrom,
Tsao, Alden & Craske, 2000) there are distinctions in content and process. Worry is
characterised more by anticipated future threats and danger (Beck, 1967, 1976) while
rumination tends to involve thoughts about current mood, past failure and loss (Wells &
Matthews, 1994). In a series of two diary studies, Papageorgiou and Wells (1999a & b)
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compared rumination and worry in both clinical and non-clinical samples. Results from both
samples indicated that rumination was associated with less verbal content, less compulsion to
act and lower effort and confidence in problem solving. Thus rumination would seem more
deleterious in terms of problem solving, when compared with worry.
Rumination has been distinguished from private self consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier &
Buss, 1975), a tendency to focus on and analyze the self, regardless of mood. Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow (1993) found that while rumination significantly predicted depression
after statistically controlling for private self-consciousness, private self-consciousness did not
significantly predict depression after controlling for rumination.
Collectively these results indicate that while rumination demonstrates some similarities with
related constructs, there are important differences which are consistent with rumination being
a distinct construct to study.
1.1.4 The negative impact ofrumination on mental health
A considerable body of research from experimental, cross-sectional and longitudinal studies
provides converging evidence suggesting that rumination in response to stressful events or
low mood is associated with the maintenance of depression. For example, people who
ruminate show longer and more severe depression or lower mood than people who tend not to
ruminate (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991, 1993; Fennel, Teasdale, Jones & Damle, 1987;
Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999). Rumination has also been associated with a
range of deleterious outcomes including negatively biased thinking; poor problem solving;
impaired motivation; inhibition of instrumental behaviour; reduced willingness to engage in
pleasant/distracting events); impaired concentration; social isolation and increased stress
(Lyubomirsky & Tkach review, 2004). In addition, rumination is associated with the
maintenance of overgeneral memory recall, a recall style characteristic of depression and
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associated with greater hopelessness, a higher number of depressive episodes and suicidal
behaviour (Williams, 1996). A number of significant studies will be reviewed below.
People who ruminate show prolonged and more severe depression / low mood
1.) A considerable number of laboratory studies demonstrate that people who respond to
dysphoria with rumination experience longer and more severe dysphoric mood than those who
employ distraction. Several studies have asked dysphoric or clinically depressed participants
to engage in rumination (e.g. "think about the kind of person you are") or distraction (e.g.
"think about the size of the statue of liberty") and found that rumination maintains or
exacerbates depressed mood while distraction provides relief (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow,
1993; Gibbons et al., 1985; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). Interestingly, rumination
manipulations have not induced depressed mood in non-dysphoric participants indicating that
depressed mood is maintained by the combination of dysphoria and rumination (Lyubomnsky
et al., 1999).
2.) Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues have studied rumination in people experiencing naturally
occurring dysphoria as a result of everyday stress or trauma. In one of a series of longitudinal
studies of bereaved people, Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker & Larson (1994) followed 300
caretaking adults whose friend or relative had died from a terminal illness. Participants were
interviewed one month prior to their loss and then at several time points after their loss.
Relatives with a more ruminative response style, as assessed using the Response Styles
Questionnaire, were more depressed six months after their loss than non-ruminators. This
result was maintained even after controlling for initial depression levels, social support and
concurrent stressors.
3.) Another frequently cited correlational study illustrating participants' response to a
traumatic event was reported by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991). As part of an ongoing
program of research, Stanford University students were given 16 ruminative and 16 distractive
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responses and asked which they used when experiencing negative or depressed mood.
Ruminative responses included items such as "1 thought, I won't be able to get anything done
if I don't snap out of this mood". Distractive responses included items such as "I did
something fun to get my mind off things". An assessment of mood was also taken. Some
students responded primarily with rumination and others primarily with distraction.
Unfortunately, but pertinent to the study, a proportion of the participants then experienced the
1989 San Francisco area earthquake. Researchers followed up those involved and found that
participants who reported ruminative tendencies before the earthquake were significantly
more likely to be depressed ten days and seven weeks after the earthquake than those with a
less ruminative style, even after initial depression, destruction witnessed and loss were
statistically controlled.
4.) In relation to major depression; prospective longitudinal studies have examined the impact
of rumination on people's risk of experiencing depression. A number of studies (Just &
Alloy, 1997; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001, Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) have found that people who
are not initially depressed, but who ruminate in response to negative mood, are more likely to
experience a major depressive episode from one to 2.5 years later. Such individuals are also
more likely to experience severe depressive symptoms. In addition, a large community based
study of, over 1,100 adults, found that people with clinical depression and a ruminative style
had more prolonged and severe symptoms one year after initial assessment, were less likely to
experience remission of depression and more likely to experience anxiety (Nolen-Hoeksema
2000).
A number of limitations to theses studies should be acknowledged. Many, but not all (e.g.
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), involve participants who are not clinically depressed, thus making
generalization to clinical samples more difficult. Further, rumination is commonly assessed
by self-report questionnaires which logically gauge people's reported response to depressed
mood. As with all self-report measures, to some extent the accuracy of people's report is
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unknown. Many of the studies have conceptualized rumination as a maladaptive and
relatively controlled, conscious process and results have therefore not been considered in the
context of potential adaptive and/or uncontrollable elements of rumination, findings may
therefore be over simplified Conversely the evidence is strengthened by the use of varied
longitudinal and experimental studies. Despite these limitations, collectively the evidence is
consistent with the assertion that ruminating in response to stressful events, low mood or
depression is associated with prolonged and more severe negative affect and depression. As
noted above, rumination has also been associated with other maladaptive outcomes, a few of
which are discussed below.
Rumination is associated with greater negative thinking and retrieval of negative memories.
For example Lyubomirsky and Tkach (2004) review experimental studies comparing
dysphoric participants who have been induced to ruminate, with non-dysphoric participants or
dysphoric participants induced to distract. Reports from a number of studies indicate that
dysphoric ruminators report more pessimistic attributions for distressing events (e.g. "I always
seem to fail"); choose more negatively biased and distorted interpretations of hypothetical life
events (e.g. minimizing experiences of success); make more negative self evaluations (e.g.
"I'm unattractive") and feel less in control of their lives (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema,
1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). In other experimental studies, depressed students who
ruminate spontaneously retrieved more recent negative memories and remembered more
historic negative events as occurring more frequently than depressed students who employed
distraction (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Pyszczynski et al., 1989).
Ruminating in response to depressed mood has been found to impair problem solving. Thus
the evidence suggests that rumination leads dysphoric individuals to consider their problems
overwhelming and unsolvable, to fail to generate effective solutions and to show reluctance to
implement any solutions (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). In a further study, Lyubomirsky and
Nolen-Hoeksema 1995 gave students a distracting or ruminative task. Following the task
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students were asked to imagine they were experiencing problems in different interpersonal
and achievement contexts (e.g. "a friend seems to be avoiding you"). Students were then
asked to write an account of the steps they would take to solve each problem. Dysphoric
ruminators generated less effective solutions than dysphoric students who distracted or non-
dysphoric students who either ruminated or distracted.
One mechanism by which rumination could undermine problem solving is by reducing
motivation and the ability to initiate coping behaviour (Lyubomirsky and Tkach, (2004). It is
logically intuitive that people who dwell on feelings of depression are more likely to feel
ineffectual in their ability to solve problems or alleviate low mood. Lyubomirsky et al (1999)
asked students to generate possible solutions to their three biggest problems. Dysphoric
students who ruminated were able to generate what they believed were effective solutions, but
engaging in rumination lowered the likelihood that they would take steps to implement these
solutions. Similarly Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) gave dysphoric ruminators
the opportunity to engage in rumination or distraction. These participants chose rumination,
despite previously indicating on a questionnaire that distracting activities would be enjoyable
and that, perhaps surprisingly, they felt capable to carry out distraction successfully.
The range of negative consequences associated with rumination can generate additional
difficulties including stress and impaired interpersonal relationships (Lyubomirsky and Tkach,
2004). For example several studies find associations between rumination and the desire for
revenge following interpersonal tension (McCullough et al., 2001); a tendency to assume
undue responsibility for others (Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson, 2001); dependency and
neediness (Spasojevic and Alloy, 2001) - factors which could plausibly generate greater
social friction and contribute to reports that people who ruminate in response to depression are
perceived less favourably by others (Schwartz & McCombs Thomas, 1995). The research
evidence for these associations come only from correlational studies, thus limiting conclusions
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relating to the direction of influence, however findings are consistent with the suggestion that
chronic ruminators style of interacting may be counterproductive.
Rumination is one factor associated with the maintenance of overgeneral memory (Williams,
1996). A body of literature has developed, indicating that overgeneral memory is a
characteristic feature of depression (Williams, 1996; Goddard et al., 1996). In overgeneral
autobiographical memory, people report general summaries of events (e.g. waiting at bus
stops) rather than producing specific autobiographical memories (e.g. standing at the bus stop,
at 8am this morning, with my sister Rosalind). Thus when asked to recall specific
autobiographical memories to positive and negative cue words, people who are parasuicidal
(Williams & Dritschell, 1988) and people with depression (Kuyken & Brewin, 1995) generate
more overgeneral memories and fewer specific memories than non-depressed control
participants.
Overgeneral memory is found to be clinically significant and is associated with more episodes
and poorer outcome in depression; impaired interpersonal problem solving; maladaptive
cognitive processing; greater hopelessness and suicidal behaviour (Kuyken & Brewin, 1995;
Sidley et al., 1997; Goddard et al., 1996; Williams, 1996; Brittlebank et al., 1993). The
process of recalling specific events, is thought to involve two stages: first people access
general descriptions and subsequently more specific information (Rubin, 1996). However in
depression, memory appears to end the search for specific details early (Williams et al., 2000).
This style of processing may reflect an attempt to cope with distressing memories, however it
prevents complete processing of specific details of events, helpful in the resolution of strong
feelings. Further this style prevents people accessing the details in memory of previously
successful strategies, for example in social problem solving (Goddard et al., 1996). Studies
suggest that rumination is one of the processes associated with the maintenance of overgeneral
memory, which in turn increases individuals' vulnerability.
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Overall, the collective evidence suggests that rumination in response to negative affect is
associated with a series of harmful consequences, which Lyubomirsky and Tkach (2004)
propose most likely interact, creating a vicious cycle of prolonged negative affect and
depression, negatively biased thinking, impaired problem solving, lowered motivation and
inhibited coping, overgeneral memory recall, impaired concentration and increased stress.
Thus there are many mechanisms by which rumination could contribute to depression and
wider emotional distress. Critics highlight that while these relationships are plausible they are
not necessarily exclusive to rumination (Matthews & Wells, 2004).
1.1.5 Individual differences in rumination
The response styles theory emphasizes that people differ in their tendency to ruminate (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). Rumination is viewed as a repetitive thought process that people employ
when sad or depressed. While many people may ruminate to some extent when sad or
depressed, longitudinal community based studies find that the tendency to ruminate when
distressed is a stable individual characteristic (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999). Specifically,
while many people engage in some rumination when low, others ruminate a great deal and
others seem not to ruminate much at all. Nolen-Hoeksema reports that these differences are
relatively stable, even as depressed moods exacerbate and remit (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004).
Rumination has been found to be associated with a number of personality characteristics
including neuroticism, pessimism and helplessness. While rumination correlates significantly
with neuroticism (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994) it is not redundant with neuroticism; in fact
rumination continues to predict depression after controlling for neuroticism. Nolen-
Hoeksema suggests that perhaps rumination is a mechanism through which neuroticism
contributes to depression. Thus, high levels of neuroticism may yield a particular cognitive
style that focusses attention on depressed mood. This cognitive style may increase the
probability of developing a ruminative response style, which in turn contributes to depression
(see also Nolan et al., 1998). Similarly, while dispositional pessimism and helplessness are
12
associated with rumination - rumination continues to predict depression after controlling for
these characteristics. These personality characteristics with rumination may increase
vulnerability to depression (see Gillanders & Fleming, (in press); Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004).
A further source of individual difference, identified by Nolen-Hoeksema, is that people who
ruminate experience more chronic stresses. She reports that in community studies ruminators
report more chronic problems, and rumination both predicts and is predicted by a history of
chronic stress. For example, Nolen-Hoeksema et al (1999) found that adults dealing with
chronic stressors, (e.g. low income, marriage and job dissatisfaction) were more likely to
ruminate - even when participants' initial depression level was statistically controlled.
In addition to personality factors and life stressors, there are important gender differences in
rumination. Just as women are twice as likely to experience episodes of depression (major
depression and milder symptoms) than men (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2002), it is consistently found
that women are also more likely to ruminate (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994). Nolen-
Hoeksema's findings suggest that the gender difference in rumination, in part mediates the
gender difference in incidence of depression. Thus when they statistically controlled for
gender differences in rumination, the gender difference in depression became non-significant.
Nolen-Hoeksema propose that differences in rumination are only one of multiple factors
contributing to women's greater vulnerability to depression, but one that keeps women "stuck
in cycles of passivity, impairing their ability to overcome other problems contributing to their
depression" (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004 pi 12).
There are many possible explanations for gender differences in rumination. Nolen-Hoeksema
discusses several: for example women report more chronic stressors (e.g. low income) and
traumatic events (e.g. sexual abuse) than men - experiences that partially contribute to gender
differences in rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1999; 1998). Furthermore a community
based study revealed that: women are more likely than men to believe that negative emotions
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are difficult to control; to feel responsible for relationships and to experience little control, or
mastery, over important life events. These factors are associated with a greater tendency to
ruminate and, though speculative, may in part result from socialization, for example girls
being less frequently encouraged to use active coping strategies than boys. Nolen-Hoeksema
acknowledges that no one variable fully accounted for gender differences and that within
women there are marked individual differences in rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson,
2001). Thus sources of individual difference in rumination include personality factors, life
stressors and gender.
1.1.6 Developmental origins ofrumination
Why do some people engage in rumination when sad, while other people seem not to? In
addition to individual differences, Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) has considered a number of
possible developmental factors which may contribute to a tendency to ruminate.
First, she speculates that children may learn to ruminate from their parents if parents model a
ruminative style. A study by Nolen-Hoeksema, Wolfson, Mumme and Guskin (1995)
provides some evidence for the impact ofmodelling. The authors found that compared with
children of non-depressed mothers, 5-7 year old children of depressed mothers were more
likely to display passive and helpless responses to frustrating situations. Further, children
whose mothers demonstrated more ruminative responses to depressed mood were more likely
to respond to challenges with a passive and helpless style.
Secondly, rumination may become an overused response to negative mood if children are not
taught alternative adaptive coping strategies such as problem solving. Children may thus be
limited in their repertoire of coping responses. In the above study (Nolen-Hoeksema et al.,
1995) the authors examined the way that parents interacted with their children when their
children were frustrated in a task. They found that when mothers were (a) intrusive and did
not allow the child to problem solve, (b) did not teach their child to attempt alternative
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strategies and (c) criticized the child for failing, children were less able to regulate emotion
becoming helpless when upset and demonstrated poorer problem solving. Nolen-Hoeksema
speculates that social reinforcements may also operate. Traditional social expectancies, of
men to be "active and strong" and women to be "nurturing" may influence parents to be more
likely to actively teach or expect sons to adopt a problem-solving approach than daughters
(Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; Siegel & Alloy, 1990). Thus while parents may not actively
encourage rumination in girls, they may be less likely to encourage active problem solving
when daughters are upset relative to sons.
Thirdly, biological mechanisms are likely to contribute to the development of a ruminative
response to low mood. People with stronger physiological responses to stress may be less
able to distract themselves from negative emotions and overcome distress, as children and
adults, resulting in greater self focus and helplessness. Nolen-Hoeksema (2004) highlights
studies indicating that children with a history of abuse or neglect may develop dysregulation
in their stress responses - indicated by differences in Cortisol, hormone and cardiac measures
between people with and without a history of abuse (Heim et al., 2000). Thus children with a
biological vulnerability to emotional dysregulation that impedes adaptive coping may develop
a stronger ruminative response style. Biological reactivity is also associated with increased
likelihood of major depression in adulthood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004). Nolen-Hoeksema
notes that research on the developmental origins of rumination is to date relatively sparse.
1.1.7 Functions ofrumination - why do people choose to ruminate?
As reflected in different theories and definitions of rumination, there is a degree of debate
regarding the extent to which people do in fact choose to ruminate or whether rumination is a
more uncontrollable process, theses issues will be explored more fully in section 1.1.9.
To the extent that rumination may be within conscious control (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), why
would people choose to ruminate given that it is associated with extensive negative outcomes?
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The work of several authors, from different theoretical perspectives, is of relevance to this
question.
From their goal progress perspective, Martin and Tesser (1989, 1996) propose that people
engage in rumination in an attempt to attain important goals which are not yet achieved.
Rumination thus serves a function of responding to a discrepancy between a person's current
and desired state in relation to attainment or progress towards a goal. Rumination enhances
self regulation by keeping information related to the unattained goal accessible in memory for
as long as the discrepancy is detected. The authors highlight that although rumination may
ultimately not be beneficial or result in goal progress, this is the intended function. Thus
individuals may choose to ruminate as they believe it will help them to progress towards
goals.
From the response styles theory perspective, Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) proposes that by
focusing attention inwardly on people's depressive feelings and the possible causes,
consequences and meaning of theses feelings and problem situations - rumination may be an
attempt by individuals to gain insight. Significant to this proposal is the study by
Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993). As previously noted, in this study dysphoric
undergraduates who were given the option of engaging in rumination or distraction chose to
ruminate. This choice was made even though participants had previously reported that they
anticipated distracting activities would be enjoyable and feasible. In fact, dysphoric
participants' self reported efficacy to undertake the distraction task did not differ significantly
to ratings by non-dysphoric participants. Interestingly, dysphoric participants believed that
rumination would lead to insight about themselves and their problems, thus undertaking
rumination even though they were aware it made them feel worse and resulted in relatively
poor problem solving. Findings were also consistent with a goal progress viewpoint in that
participants indicated that insight represented a valued goal, such that the attainment of insight
(low level goal 1) would lead to resolution of depression (higher level goal 2). Nolen-
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Hoeksema notes anecdotally that ruminators will report feeling that they are "finally being
realistic about facing their problems" when ruminating. Such positive beliefs and senses
about rumination, in combination with demanding feeling of low mood, most likely reinforce
a ruminative response style. People may choose to ruminate as they believe it will lead to
insight.
In their S-REF model, Wells and Matthews (1994) view rumination as one of several factors
involved in increasing vulnerability to and maintaining different emotional disorders.
Rumination and worry are viewed as coping strategies that people can, on several levels,
choose to engage in. They propose that the choice to ruminate is based on a meta-cognitive
belief (a belief about beliefs, including rumination) in the value or purpose of rumination.
Thus the information people hold in their knowledge base, the model's third level, makes
them more or less vulnerable to select and engage in rumination as a coping strategy.
Empirical support for the model and the role of meta-cognitive beliefs about rumination has
been found in a series of studies by Papageorgiou and Wells (2001a & b; 2003).
Papageorgiou and Wells (2001a & b) carried out semi-structured interviews with participants
with major depression to assess the presence and content of meta-cognitive beliefs about
rumination. They found that all participants reported holding both positive and negative
beliefs about rumination. Themes within positive beliefs reflected viewing rumination as a
coping strategy, for example "I need to ruminate in order to understand / find answers to my
depression". Themes within negative beliefs reflected viewing rumination as (a)
uncontrollable and harmful and (b) resulting in negative interpersonal outcomes. Examples
include "ruminating about my problems is uncontrollable" and "people will reject me if I
ruminate".
From initial interviews the authors developed two self-report scales to assess positive and
negative beliefs about depressive rumination: the Positive Beliefs about Rumination Scale
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(PBRS Papageorgiou & Wells 2001a) and the Negative Beliefs about Rumination Scale
(NBRS Papageorgiou, Wells and Meina, in preparation) that show good psychometric
properties. Subsequent studies revealed that positive and negative metacognitive beliefs are
significantly and positively correlated with rumination and depression in samples of people
with clinical depression (Papageorgiou and Wells, 2003) and non clinical samples
(Papageorgiou and Wells, 2001a & b; 2003). Path models revealed that, higher endorsement
of meta-cognitive beliefs is associated with greater tendency to ruminate and in turn with
higher levels of depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001c; 2003).
In relation to metacognitive beliefs, the S-REF model suggests that positive beliefs about
rumination will encourage people to engage in repeated rumination. However, once
rumination is operating, people appraise the experience as (a) uncontrollable and harmful and
(b) likely to generate negative social responses. Negative beliefs about rumination thus
exacerbate the experience of depression and a cycle of interactions between rumination,
depression and metacognition may contribute to the maintenance of depression (Papageorgiou
& Wells, 2004). Nolen-Hoeksema (2004) points out that the origins of positive and negative
metacognitions are as yet unknown.
Though considered separately by the different studies, there is overlap between the concepts
of goal attainment, insight and wider metacognitive beliefs. Metacognitive beliefs refer to any
belief about thinking. This broad category includes all positive and negative thoughts about
rumination. The valued goal related beliefs are an example of a subset of metacognitive
beliefs, the subset of beliefs that goal attainment (e.g. promotion) is necessary for the
individual to attain their desired state (e.g. self worth). The belief that rumination will result
in insight to relieve depression is an example of one specific positive metacognitive belief,
that as previously described could also belong the subset of goal related beliefs. Distinction
between the concepts reflects the focus of different studies. Overall it would seem that to the
extent that people are able to choose to ruminate in response to depressed mood, they may do
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so as they initially believe it will be helpful: in an effort to attain valued goals, gain insight or
as a response to other positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination.
1.1.8. To what extent is rumination adaptive versus maladaptive?
As previously indicated, different theoretical approaches explore to a differing degree, the
possibility that rumination may be adaptive and functional as well as maladaptive. Nolen-
Hoeksema's work has focused predominantly on the deleterious impact of rumination,
emphasizing that even efforts to self-reflect in the context of problem solving can result in
recyclic negative thinking leading to impaired mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1996). In contrast
Martin and Tesser (1996) propose that, though not always, rumination can be adaptive in
leading an individual towards solving a problem. Wells and Matthews (1994;1996) view
rumination as a coping strategy but highlight that it can become unhelpful, interfering with
adaptive coping, where people are unable to resolve a discrepancy between current and
desired state or to give up a goal.
Nolen-Hoeksema (2004) and others consider that the evidence found depends very much on
how you define or operationalise rumination. Treynor et al (in press) carried out a recent
factor analysis of the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS of the Response Styles Questionnaire:
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), a measure used in many studies to assess people's
tendency to ruminate when distressed. Two factors were found, labeled as "reflection" and
"brooding". Reflection represented "a purposeful turning inward to engage in cognitive
problem solving to alleviate depression"; while brooding represented "a passive comparison
of ones current situation with some unachieved standard" (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004 pi 16).
Although reflection was associated with greater current depression, it was associated with less
depression over time in longitudinal analysis. Brooding, however, was correlated with greater
depression both currently and in the long term. The authors suggest that in contrast to
brooding which appears generally maladaptive, reflection may either trigger or result from
low mood in the short term, but eventually lead to adaptive responses (e.g. such as problem
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solving) with concurrent reduction in depression. Thus perhaps not all forms of rumination
are maladaptive. Further evidence for this suggestion comes from the recent work of Watkins,
Teasdale and Baracaia in the context of the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems model (ICS:
Teasdale & Barnard, 1993).
Watkins and Teasdale (2004) highlight that in addition to the large body of research that
reveals maladaptive consequences of ruminative self focus, there is evidence suggesting that
cognitive focus on mood, problems and self experience can be of benefit. In brief, studies
indicate that a form of self focus is necessary for successful emotional processing of negative
mood in the short term (Hunt 1998). Self focus also facilitates more effective self regulation
and greater self awareness and self-knowledge (Carver & Scheier, 1990). Furthermore,
reducing the negative effects of ruminative self focus by distracting attention away from self
related information may not be ideal in terms of dealing with recurrent depression. Watkins
and Teasdale (2004) point out that firstly many people with depression find attempts at
continuing distraction too effortful; secondly distraction may strengthen thought suppression
and avoidance which are both associated with recurring negative mood; thirdly, distraction
removes the likelihood of knowing ones thoughts and feelings or developing alternative
interpretations of experiences - both key components to cognitive therapies for depression
(Beck, 1979; Teasdale, 1999).
Teasdale (1999) reconciles these contrasting findings in the suggestion that there are distinct
types of self-focused attention that impact on functioning differently. Specifically the authors
contrast experiential self-focus with an analytic, conceptual-evaluative style of self focus.
Experiential self-focus is characterised by focusing attention on one's intuitive experience and
raising awareness of emotions. This form of self-focus is thought to be adaptive and shares
some similarity with Nolen-Hoeksema's "reflection" factor (e.g. purposeful attending). In
contrast conceptual-evaluative self focus is characterised by analytical thinking about the
meanings, consequences and causes of emotions in an effort to make sense of ones
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experience. This form of self-focus more closely resembles "brooding" and is associated with
maladaptive outcomes. The distinction between these types of self focus is consistent with
assumptions from Teasdale and Barnard's Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS: 1993)
model and supported by a growing number of studies, a few of which will be considered
shortly.
ICS provides a very detailed framework of how people may process information and the
impact of information processing on emotion and cognition. As part of the ICS model,
Teasdale and Barnard propose that incoming infonnation can be synthesized and represented
at two qualitatively different levels of meaning: the propositional level and the implicational
level. The propositional level processes information that includes specific facts that can be
explicitly represented in language (e.g. Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland). The
implicational level processes information that takes the fonn of an implicit "felt sense" based
on patterns of experience (e.g. a sense of belonging or national pride). The model suggests
that, at any one time, people can only process information at one of these two levels.
Furthermore it is proposed that it is only implicational representations that are involved in the
generation and experience of emotion. The suggestion is that processing infonnation mainly
at the propositional level is characterised by a conceptual-evaluative or analytical thinking
about the self that focuses on discrepancies. In contrast processing information predominantly
at the implicational level is characterised by a non-evaluative experiential awareness
(Watkins, 2004).
A growing body of research supports the distinction of different types of self focus. Several
studies investigate the impact of different types of self focus on people's recall of overgeneral
memories. As previously noted, overgeneral autobiographical memory (Williams, 1996) is
sometimes observed in people when they are asked to recall a specific personal memory.
Watkins and Teasdale (2004) also report that overgeneral memory has previously been found
to be higher in people with depression that non-depressed individuals (Williams, 1996); is
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associated with maladaptive cognitive processing and poorer outcome in depression and other
difficulties (e.g. PTSD). In an experimental study, Watkins and Teasdale (2004) induced
participants with major depression to engage in either experiential or analytical self focus and
then gave participants an autobiographical memory test. They found that engaging in
experiential self focus reduced overgeneral memory recall in depressed participants relative to
depressed participants who undertook analytic self focus. In this study the format of self
focus did not result in different effects on mood. This study replicates a similar study by
Watkins and Teasdale (2001). The authors acknowledge that the studies are somewhat limited
by the absence of a control group (e.g. patients not currently engaged in any form of
rumination) making it uncertain if overgeneral memory was maintained by analytical self
focus or reduced by experiential self focus. It is also perhaps surprising that no difference in
mood was detected. However the differential impact of types of self focus on emotional
experience was demonstrated in a further study by Watkins (2004).
Watkins (2004) asked university volunteers who did not have major depression to write about
an induced failure experience on a problem solving task. Participants were also led to believe
that performance on the task was associated with intelligence. Instructions for writing about
participants' experience of the task induced them to process information in either a conceptual
evaluative manner (why did you feel this way? What were the causes, meaning for your
performance) or an experiential manner (how did you feel moment by moment during the test
and now?). Watkins found that 12 hours after the failure experience, people with a tendency
to ruminate experienced greater negative mood in the conceptual-evaluative condition than in
the experiential condition. Further, the conceptual-evaluative style of processing was
associated with participants experiencing more intrusions about the failure experience than
from experiential processing.
Type of self focus has also been demonstrated to influence problem solving. Watkins and
Baracaia (2002) gave currently depressed, recovered depressed and never depressed
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participants a social problem solving test. For each problem scenario participants were asked
to review either (a) state type questions on the causes of the problem, similar to a conceptual
evaluative style of self focus (e.g. what caused this problem?); (b) process type questions on
how they are deciding to solve the problem, similar to a reflective / experiential style (e.g.
how am I deciding on a way to solve this problem?) or (c) no questions. As expected, in the
no questions condition, depressed participants were more impaired at social problem solving
than the other participants. Process focused questions resulted in significantly better social
problem solving in depressed patients compared with the state or no questions. Further,
compared with process questions, state questions impaired social problem solving among
recovered depressed participants.
The collective evidence would suggest that while certain forms of ruminative self-focus
(conceptual-evaluative; brooding) are consistently associated with negative outcomes, other
types of self-focus (experiential; reflection) may be less deleterious in the long term and
would appear to be of benefit in raising self awareness and facilitating many of the processes
often undermined in ruminative self-focus (social problem solving, specific memoiy recall,
recovery from failure and mood). The studies also highlight the value of clarity in defining
what aspects of rumination are being assessed in research.
1.1.9 To what extent is rumination automatic versus controlled?
Many studies and models view rumination as a predominantly conscious, controlled process
that people choose to engage in, as opposed to distraction or problem solving (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). This choice is made in the pursuit of goals (Martin and Tesser, 1989,
1996), to gain insight or in response to wider metacognitive beliefs (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1993; Wells & Matthews, 1994). There is also evidence and discussion in the
literature to suggest that rumination, particularly in depression, demonstrates an
uncontrollable and automatic quality (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Pyszczynski & Greenberg,
1987).
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Within S-REF (Wells & Matthews, 1994) distinctions are made between processes that are
controlled and those which may operate more automatically. Thus while the model maintains
that level two S-REF processing (appraisal and initiating coping strategies) and level three
activation of self knowledge (including metacognitive beliefs about rumination) are
controlled, conscious processes - it also suggests that coping strategies operate in part by
attempting to influence lower level automatic processes such as intrusive thoughts and bodily
sensations.
An important component ofTeasdale and Barnard's ICS information processing model (1993)
is the concept of depressive interlock. The authors suggest that each level or subsystem of the
model, including implicational and prepositional subsystems, sends codes of the particular
type of information generated at that subsystem, to the other subsystems, as appropriate on the
basis of learned co-occurring regularities of experience. In other words there is tr ansmission
of information between components. Depressive interlock occurs between processing at the
prepositional and implicational levels of meaning, in response to depression and self relevant
information. Specifically, interlock occurs when prepositional meanings (e.g. I failed this
task last time) generate implicational information (e.g. a felt sense of being useless or
worthless) which in turn feeds back into the prepositional model from which it was generated,
adding to the prepositional model (e.g. I can't do this, it's my fault). Thus information
processing becomes locked or stuck on a theme, in a reciprocal feedback cycle that in turn
maintains depressed mood. This cycle of information exchange between different levels of
meaning is conceptualized to operate automatically rather than, for example, as a conscious
attempt at coping. There is some evidence to support the concept of depressive interlock, for
example where individuals with depression demonstrate perseveration, becoming stuck, in
their responses to negatively and positively toned self related information, but not to neutral
information (Gillanders & Fleming, (in press)). Correlations of rumination with
neuropsychological processes are consistent with elements of repetitive thinking being less
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conscious and controllable (see Degllnnocenti, Agren & Backman, 1998). Though testing the
model is somewhat limited by its complexity and lack of definition of implicational
representations, evidence for an automatic element to rumination also emerges in further
models and studies detailed below.
Another model suggesting that rumination in depression may be less controllable than
sometimes assumed comes from Pyszczynski and Greenberg's self-regulatory model of
depression (1987). The model suggests that depression is initiated by loss of an important
source of self worth (e.g. a relationship / job / role). The person will try to reduce the
discrepancy between their current state (loss of worth) and desired state (self worth) for
example by replacing what was lost or devaluing / minimizing the lost object. If they are
unable to replace or devalue what is lost, they become stuck in an automatic cycle of self-
regulation and self focus, locked onto the discrepancy between actual and desired state. This
constant mental cycling is effortful and leads to strong negative emotions.
The authors develop their model in relation to Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale's (1978)
Revised Learned Helplessness theory. Specifically it is suggested that when someone
becomes stuck in a self-regulatory cycle they begin to make more internal, stable and global
attributions for negative events (e.g. explaining a redundancy as "I have nothing to
contribute"). Such attributions may be the only way that a person can stop the unpleasant
self-regulatory cycle; however they generate the formation of a negative identity. Given that
exiting the self-regulatory cycle is negatively reinforcing, through relief from mental effort
and distress, further negative attributions are likely, thus building on a negative identity and
maintaining low mood and ultimately depression (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987).
Experimental evidence in support of Pyszczynski and Greenberg's model includes work by
Carr, Teasdale and Broadbent (1991). In this study non-clinically depressed participants were
given a sentence completion task that assessed the extent to which participants were self-
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focused versus externally focused. The task was given to participants before and immediately
after they were induced to experience elated or dysphoric mood. It was found that in
comparison to elated mood, dysphoric mood significantly increased self focus but did not
reduce positive or neutral external focus. The findings are consistent with the model's
hypothesis that negative mood is associated with an increased self focus. As previously
discussed, the finding that self-focused dysphoric rumination is associated with negative
outcomes such as increase in retrieval of negative autobiographical memories (Lyubomirsky
et al, 1998) and poorer social problem solving (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002) supports the
suggestion that a self-regulatory system such as Pyszczynski and Greenberg's is unhelpful in
managing mood, particularly for people with significant life stressors and few coping
resources.
It would seem important to recognize the contribution of models and studies highlighting an
uncontrollable quality to rumination - particularly within the context of depression. Just as
different types of self focused thinking may be more or less adaptive and harmful, different
aspects ofmechanisms of rumination may be more or less within a person's conscious control.
This would have implications for treatment of rumination in depression and in broadening our
understanding of why people may continue to ruminate even when it fails to effectively
manage mood.
1.1.10 Therapeutic Implications
The research findings outlined to date have resulted in a number of treatment approaches that
aim, in part, to address rumination and relieve depression. No one theory or conceptualization
is dominant in terms of efficacy (Robinson et al., 1990) and Nolen-Hoeksema suggests that
perhaps a rationale to understand rumination and steps to overcome the associated negative
outcomes and distress are the common factors in therapeutic benefit. The main suggested
therapeutic approaches, that most directly address rumination, include cognitive-behavioural
therapy (CBT: Beck et al., 1979); work that targets metacognitive beliefs (Papageorgiou &
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Wells, 2001a&b) and mindfulness based cognitive therapy for depression (MBCT Segal et al.,
2002; Teasdale et al., 2000) discussed in brief below.
The cognitive component of CBT involves patients identifying negative thoughts within
patterns of rumination and considering alternative interpretations of the situation. Nolen-
Hoeksema (2004) reports a suggestion given by Teasdale et al (1995): that CBT is helpful, not
because the content of negative thoughts at times of low mood change, but because patients
learn to step back from distressing cognitions when they occur, consider the validity of the
thought and replace the message with a more adaptive one (Nolen-Hoekseina, 2004). The
behavioural component of CBT would involve teaching patients skills in active problem
solving and distraction to interrupt or prevent an unhelpful cycle of ruminative thought.
Distraction and problem solving have been shown to be beneficial (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995) particularly where problem solving addresses overcoming the tendency to
feel uncertain about implementing solutions (Ward et al., 2003). Given previous
considerations of uncontrollable elements to rumination and the adaptive features of some
elements of self-focus, these strategies alone may be insufficient to treat people experiencing a
near continuous state ofanalytic rumination.
In the context of the S-REF model, Papageorgiou and Wells (2001a&b) propose that
interventions should focus on addressing patient's metacognitive beliefs about rumination that
maintain analytic rumination as a viable coping strategy. Positive beliefs about rumination
could be countered but further negative beliefs (rumination will make me kill myself), that
exacerbate negative mood, could be addressed to normalize the experience of repetitive
thinking, highlighting the adaptive elements of experiential self-focus.
Mindfulness based cognitive therapy (MBCT Segal et al., 2002) suggests that people with
depression practice becoming mindfully self-aware, observing ruminative thoughts and
emotional states in a non-judgmental and non-evaluative manner. Mindful self awareness is
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akin to experiential self focus (Teasdale, 1999) and aims to help people disengage from
thoughts that seem, and perhaps to an extent are, uncontrollable. The process of detachment
may provide a better state from which to consider alternative coping strategies. MBCT was
originally developed to teach recovered but recurrently depressed people to disengage from
rumination at times of possible relapse. Two randomized controlled trials (Ma & Teasdale,
(in press); Teasdale et al., 2000) found that in comparison to treatment as usual, MBCT
reduced relapse rates by 50% in patients with three or more previous episodes of major
depression. Therapeutic approaches that promote adaptive self reflection while equipping
patients with alternative coping mechanisms to analytic rumination would reflect the breadth
of empirical evidence on rumination to date.
1.1.11 Summary
The issues considered thus far, within the literature on rumination, are summarized below.
DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) provides a pragmatic definition of major depression as
characterised by chronic sadness and / or loss of interest or pleasure in most previously
enjoyed activities, accompanied by a range of possible biopsychosocial difficulties.
Rumination can be broadly defined as persistent, recursive thinking. Definitions of
mmination vary, however, from different theoretical perspectives in scope and the extent to
which rumination is considered controllable and maladaptive. This study focuses on
rumination in the context of people's beliefs about their goals. Following Nolen-Hoeksema
(1991) and Martin, Tesser & Mcintosh (1993) rumination will be defined as mentally
replaying or focusing on negative thoughts and feelings, their causes and consequences, in
response to the occurrence of a stressful event including depressed mood and negative affect.
Though sharing some similarities, mmination can be distinguished from related mental
constructs such as negative automatic thoughts, worry and private self consciousness (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2004; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004).
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Rumination in response to depressed or dysphoric mood has been associated with a range of
harmful outcomes, particularly a prolonged and more severe depression (Just & Alloy, 1997;
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Wider associated negative outcomes include greater negative
thinking and retrieval of negative memories (Lyubomirsky et al 1998; 1999); poorer general
and social problem solving (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002); reduced
motivation, autobiographical over general memory (Williams, 1996), reduced instrumental
behaviour and associated stress and interpersonal difficulties (Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004).
Some people appear to engage in rumination following low mood and stress far more than
others. A tendency to ruminate is associated with various personality characteristics (e.g.
neuroticism) and increased life stressors (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994; 1999). Gender
differences exist, with women demonstrating a greater propensity to ruminate as well as a
greater vulnerability to depression than men (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994). Nolen-
Hoeksema (1991) suggests a number of developmental origins for rumination including
children learning to ruminate from their parents, lack of alternative coping strategies and
biological mechanisms.
One area of discussion within the literature examines why people might engage in a
ruminative style of response. Research indicates that pursuit of goals (Martin & Tesser, 1989;
1996), gaining insight (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993) and other metacognitive
beliefs about the functionality of rumination are of relevance (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a
& b). Studies exploring different facets of self-focused attention reveal that experiential,
reflective self focus seems adaptive for example by raising self awareness and facilitating
social problem solving. In contrast a conceptual-evaluative, analytical style of self focus is
associated with maladaptive outcomes (Teasdale & Watkins; Watkins, 2004; Watkins &
Baracaia 2002). This study will consider the impact of goal beliefs in relation to the more
maladaptive analytical style of rumination. Finally, while some aspects of rumination may be
conscious and controllable (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) other elements would seem far less
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controllable or automatic (Wells & Matthews, 1994; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Pyszczynski
& Greenberg, 1987). This debate within the literature provides a broader understanding of
rumination in depression and is reflected in different therapeutic suggestions such as
distraction; problem solving and mindfulness based cognitive therapy (Segal et al, 2002).
As this study will focus on goal beliefs and rumination, the next section will examine the
literature on goal linking and Martin et al's (1989; 3 993) goal progress theoiy in more detail.
It is helpful to consider these issues within the broader background of research on rumination
previously discussed.
1.2 Goal Linking
1.2.1 The Goal Progress Theory ofRumination
For clarity, the goal progress theory will be presented first and evidence to support the model
considered subsequently. To recap, authors of the goal progress theory (Martin & Tesser,
1989, 1996; Martin, Tesser & Mcintosh, 1993) offer a broad definition of rumination as
recurring thoughts that revolve around a common theme (Martin & Tesser, 1989), that are
often experienced as intrusive and aversive, remaining conscious for some time despite
people's efforts to reduce them (Mcintosh & Martin, 1992). A key aspect of the model is the
view that rumination is a tendency to think repeatedly about important unattained goals.
Rumination is thought to be triggered when people perceive that they have failed to reach an
important goal or that they are failing to progress towards a goal at a sufficient rate. People
engage in rumination as an attempt to make progress towards the goal (e.g. generating
alternative paths to the goal, possibly enhancing the salience of the goal thus increasing
motivation). The model suggests that rumination continues until the goal, or progress, is
attained or the individual gives the goal up. In this respect the model shares similarities with
Pyszczynski & Greenberg's self regulatory cycle and the S-REF view of rumination as an
attempt to resolve a discrepancy between current and desired states.
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Important to one of the model's proposed underlying causes of rumination is the Zeigarnik
effect. Zeigarnik (1938) found that information that relates to incomplete tasks tends to be
held in memory for longer than information relating to completed ones. Specifically,
participants were given several repetitive tasks to do (e.g. stringing beads), some they were
allowed to complete while others were interrupted. Participant's recalled more of the
interrupted tasks. This finding was replicated by a number of authors (Millar et al., 1988;
Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). This supports the suggestion that failure to reach a goal keeps
information about the goal highly accessible in mind. Infonnation related to unattained goals
has also been found to be more easily cued and more likely to be drawn on than information
which is as relevant but less accessible (Martin et al., 2001). Therefore information which
might be otherwise ignored or not noticed, may trigger rumination. Clark, Henry and Taylor
(1991) illustrate these processes with an example: a woman who wishes to have a baby but
discovers she is infertile (unattained goal) may experience highly accessible thoughts about
infertility. Thus if she passes displays of baby food in the supermarket, she may be induced to
ruminate about infertility even though the display would have little effect on others in whom
thoughts related to infertility were less accessible, or in herself prior to diagnosis. Thus the
theory proposes that it is the increased accessibility of goal related infonnation that gives rise
to rumination. It is interesting to consider, in such an example, what the purpose of
rumination might be? The woman knows that she will not reach her goal of conceiving a
baby; therefore rumination cannot result in goal progress. Perhaps where goals cannot be
attained, rumination occurs as an attempt to process the associated emotional distress and
reduce the discrepancy between actual and desired states.
Within the context of goal progress, rumination is viewed as serving a function through self-
regulation. Accessible goal related infonnation gives rise to rumination and in turn
rumination keeps goal related information accessible, increasing the likelihood that goal
related infonnation that might assist with progress will be detected and processed. Arguably
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rumination could detect infonnation that facilitates problem solving strategies, resulting in
progress and termination of rumination, an adaptive outcome; or it may result in more
rumination and prolonged recursive thinking, ultimately maladaptive if not leading to goal
progress. Thus, the authors acknowledge, while rumination does not always help someone
progress with goals, that is the intended function. This part of the model is compatible with
Wells and Matthew's S-REF model and with Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1987), in that
rumination is perceived as promoting self-regulation, serving a function and is triggered by a
discrepancy between current and desired state.
The authors suggest that people's goals are structured in hierarchies, such that people pursue
lower order, day to day, goals (e.g. losing weight or writing a letter) to reach important higher
order goals (e.g. being happy or communicating love to a partner). Goals lower in the
hierarchy are considered easier to substitute or abandon than higher goals. Martin et al (1993)
illustrate that if a person was unable to write their partner a letter, they could telephone to
communicate love. Being unable to attain lower order goals will engender rumination only to
the extent that it blocks higher order goals. For example, if writing a letter is the only option
available to communicate with a partner, then inability to write is more likely to lead to
mmination than where multiple options are available. The higher a goal in the hierarchy, the
more likely a threat to this goal will engender rumination. For example, for someone who only
links weight to a health goal, failing to lose weight will be more likely to lead to rumination if
it is putting health at serious risk than if it only means making clothes a little tight. For
another individual who links weight to a social acceptability goal, however, clothes being
tight may lead to much rumination. Furthermore, it is proposed that while some hierarchies
are objective and inevitable (e.g. must unlock a door before opening it), others are quite
personal and subjective (e.g. does being rich really lead to happiness?). This subjectivity
means that different people can draw different conclusions from the same goal threat.
Mcintosh, Flarlow and Martin (1995) provide an illustration: thus two people may wish to lose
some weight, but over a week neither does. Person one links weight loss (a lower order goal)
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to being able to start a romantic relationship, being loved and ultimately being happy (a higher
order goal), while person two does not. The hierarchy assumption would suggest that person
one is more likely to ruminate than person two, for whom not losing weight is just this and not
linked to not being happy, even though both have experienced the same objective stress (e.g.
being 51bs overweight).
By definition "goal linking" is where people link the achievement or failure of a low level day
to day goal (e.g. losing weight) to the achievement or failure of a higher level goal (e.g. being
happy) (Mcintosh & Martin, 1992). Importantly, the authors suggest that people differ in the
extent to which they link goals (Mcintosh & Martin, 1992). People who make a lot of links
between lower and higher level goals, "linkers", maintain that achieving the low level goals
(e.g. weight loss) are necessary for attaining the higher order goal (e.g. happiness). In contrast
"non-linkers" may see specific low level goals as desirable but not view higher order goals as
contingent on day to day goals. Linking, as a set of beliefs, thus represents a further form of
metacognition. Further people who link lower order goals (e.g. having a new car) to higher
order goals (e.g. improved social life /status) are more likely to ruminate and experience lower
mood until the lower order goal is met than people who don't make such links.
Although the authors often discuss linking and non-linking as separate styles, they recognize
that linking is perhaps better conceptualized as a continuum with people being more or less
linked to any given goal. It is suggested that one mechanism by which rumination may
influence mood is by a polarizing affect: thus the more people consider something that makes
them feel positive or negative, the more extreme the initial emotion becomes (Mcintosh &
Martin, 1992). In addition a distinction is made between linking and viewing a goal as
important. In other words, people can view a goal as worth striving for without considering
that higher order goals (e.g. happiness) are contingent on it. It is well recognised as necessary
for day to day functioning and health to pursue goals (Millar & Seligman, 1975; Mcintosh &
Martin, 1992).
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The model thus suggests that goal linking, the belief that attaining specific sub goals leads to
attainment of important higher order goals, can cause people to ruminate when lower order
goals are threatened and in turn will be associated with greater low mood and depression. The
model predicts that compared with non-linkers, people who link goals are more likely to
experience rumination and prolonged depression following stressful events. Further it is
predicted that rumination mediates the relationship between linking and negative affect
(Mcintosh & Martin, 1992; Martin et al., 1993; 1996). Figure one below illustrates the role of
goal beliefs in rumination and negative affect. Evidence for these predictions will be explored
more fully shortly.
Finally, the authors note that ironically the attainment ofmany objective life situations (new
car, weight loss) are not good predictors of long term happiness. Thus Kammann (1982)
found that most objective life circumstances accounted for less than 5% of the variance in
people's judgements of subjective well being. The authors explain this phenomenon in
relation to Adaptation-level-theory (Brickman et ah, 1978; Helson, 1964) which suggests that
well being judgements are made by comparing experience to an internal subjective neutral
point which shifts with experience. Thus events that at one time seem very positive (having a
new car), may seem less so after people get used to experiencing them. According to the
theory what is important in well being and happiness judgements are people's perceptions of
events (Mcintosh & Martin, 1992). Why therefore do some people, linkers, believe that
attaining certain low level goals are necessary for higher goals such as happiness? It is
suggested that perhaps linkers are following culturally shared theories rather than attending to











Figure 1. Adapted from The Linkage Model (Mcintosh & Martin 1992; Martin et al 1993;
1996).
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1.2.2 Evidence for the Goal ProgressModel
Evidence for the role of goal progress in rumination is reviewed by Martin, Tesser &
Mcintosh 1993. In one study, participants were given a task in which they were asked to
report on their stream of thoughts. In one group, participants were told to think about
anything they wanted, including a white bear, they were also asked to put a mark on a sheet of
paper each time they experienced white bear thoughts. Two other groups ofparticipants were
instructed not to think of a white bear and were given a similar sheet to mark if they did.
The format of this study followed Wegner, Schneider, Carter and White (1987) who had
previously demonstrated that attempts to suppress a thought can result in it coming to mind
more often. From a goal progress point of view, heightened accessibility of the thought does
not result directly from attempts at thought suppression, but rather from participants failing to
attain the higher order goal of maintaining self control, resulting in a "Zeigamik" type effect
of increased accessibility ofwhite bear thoughts (see Martin et al., 1993).
As a test of this hypothesis, after the task, Martin et al gave positive feedback to one of the
groups of participants who had been attempting to suppress white bear thoughts. For these
participants, the researcher noted the number of times participants had recorded experiencing
this thought and informed them that they had done much better than most people at thought
suppression and had good thought control. The rationale was that success feedback would
represent goal attainment for these participants, even though participants in both suppression
groups found the task equally difficult.
To assess accessibility of thoughts, participants were given a word recognition task. Words
were presented letter at a time on computer screen and participants were asked to identify the
words as quickly as possible. Some words presented related to a white bear (e.g. iceberg,
polar). As with many reaction time experiments (e.g. Furhman & Shavitt, 1990) the
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assumption was that the more accessible white bear information was to participants, the faster
their recognition ofwhite bear related words.
It was found that participants who attempted suppression and did not receive success feedback
demonstrated fastest reaction times to white bear related words only. There was no difference
in reaction times between participants who did not suppress and those who had been given
success feedback. Thus providing participants with an indication that they had attained the
goal of thought control, appeared to reduce the heightened accessibility of white bear / goal
related thoughts that usually follows thought suppression, as experienced by the no feedback
suppression group. The study supports the goal progress model's proposal that goal non-
attainment is related to increased accessibility of goal related thoughts. Reduced accessibility
of thoughts is presumed to reduce the likelihood of rumination (Martin et al., 2004).
Martin, Shira and Startup 2004 highlight another study, by Koole, Smeets, Van Kippenberg
and Dijksterhuis (1999), which provides evidence that attaining higher order goals is involved
in ending rumination. Undergraduate students were given a mock intelligence test and then
given false failure feedback that they had performed poorly. As predicted, the failure
induction produced ruminative thinking in participants and reduced mood. In terms of goal
progress the assumption is that the failure feedback frustrated participant's sense of attaining
the higher order goal of being intelligent, leading to rumination.
After the failure feedback, participants were provided with an opportunity to express or affirm
a range ofpersonal values. The values affirmed by some participants were those that they had
previously indicated were central to their self-identity. Other participants affirmed values that
they had noted were more peripheral to their self-identity. Giving expression to values central
to participant's identity is a form of self affirmation (Steele, 1988) that could remind
participants of their general competence. From a goal progress perspective the self affirmation
reminded participants that they had already achieved the higher order goal of competence.
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Again, a reaction time task, where participants were asked to identify whether a group of
letters were real words or not as quickly as possible, was used to assess accessibility of goal
related information. It was found that participants who did not reaffirm values central to
their identity demonstrated the fastest reaction times to intelligence related words only,
compared with participants who did express central values. Thus while all participants had
the same experience of failure feedback, participants who had no opportunity to confirm their
previous attainment of the higher order goal (competence, intelligence), still had more
accessible goal related infonnation in mind than those who self-affirmed and were potentially
more vulnerable to rumination.
Two studies by Mcintosh & Martin (1992) provide empirical support for the predicted
connections between failure to attain higher order goals and the impact of goal linking on
rumination and affect. In the first study, the authors developed a measure of global linking
which assessed the extent to which participants believe that higher order goals (e.g. happiness)
are dependent on certain kinds of lower order goals (e.g. weight, being in a romantic
relationship). Participants also completed a ten item measure of rumination: items such as
"when I have a problem I tend to think about it a lot of the time" were rated on a 7 point
Likert scale from "does not describe me well" to "does describe me well". To assess
happiness, participants estimated the percentage of time they felt happy, unhappy or neutral.
Positive and negative affect was assessed with the Positive and Negative Affect Scale
(Watson, 1988).
Correlational analysis demonstrated that, consistent with the model, the more people linked
day to day goals with the higher order goal of happiness, the greater levels of reported
rumination (r=.30, p<001). The more people ruminated, the more negative affect (r=.29,
p<01) and unhappiness (r=.37, p<001) they reported. The more people believed attaining
currently unattained goals would make them happy, the more negative affect was reported
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(r=. 18, p<.05). Linking was not initially related to unhappiness until goal importance was
statistically controlled for - then linking was related to greater unhappiness. The findings
support the prediction that linking of desired but unattained goals is related to rumination,
negative affect and unhappiness.
Following Baron and Kenny's (1986) criteria for determining if a variable is a mediator, the
authors found that when rumination was included with linking in the regression equation, the
relationships between linking and unhappiness and between linking and negative affect were
removed, while the relationships between rumination and happiness and between rumination
and negative affect remained significant. Thus the study provides support for the authors'
suggestion that rumination mediated the relationships between linking and unhappiness and
between linking and negative affect.
In a second experiment, using their linking measure, Mcintosh and Martin split undergraduate
students into groups of linkers and non-linkers. The goal of having a romantic relationship
was chosen as an important goal to the majority, which some participants would want and
have, while others would want and not have. Participants then completed a brief survey of
questions about their love life such as "do you have a steady girlfriend?" and "when were you
last out on a date?" The survey enabled researchers to divide participants according to who
was currently in a relationship and to remind participants whether this goal was attained or
not. Participants completed a reaction time task, in which words were presented on computer
one letter at a time, where participants had to identify the word as quickly as possible. Some
of the words related to romantic relationships (e.g. romance). As before the task was
considered an assessment of accessibility of relationship related information that is presumed
to underlie rumination.
Consistent with the model's hypothesis that rumination is a function of unattained higher
order goals: linkers who wanted a romantic relationship had faster reaction times, only to
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relationship related words (greater rumination), than linkers who were currently in a
relationship. There was no significant difference in reaction times for non linkers whether in a
relationship or not. Interestingly, linkers currently in a relationship demonstrated slower
reaction times to relationship related words than non-linkers in relationships. Though
speculative, the authors suggest this difference reflects that for linkers in a relationship, the
relationship goal has been met, is less urgent and other goals now take priority. Non-linkers
are less occupied by other unmet goals and completing the questionnaire has recently made
relationships more salient.
If, as the model predicts, relationships exist between goal attainment, rumination and
depression - then it could be predicted that the more goals a person fails to attain, the greater
rumination and depression they will experience (Martin et al., 1993). A naturalistic study by
Millar, Tesser and Millar (1988) supports this suggestion. Undergraduate students in their
first term at university were asked to identify the person closest to them prior to moving away
to university. They also made a list of activities they had regularly done with this person and
which activities they had resumed at university. An inventory by Horowitz et al (1979) was
used to assess how much participants ruminated about the person. The Beck Depression
Inventory was used to assess mood. Disrupted activities which had not been replaced were
considered to reflect goal non-attainment.
As predicted the study found that the more interrupted activities students reported, the greater
their ratings of rumination and depression, while the more resumed activities students
reported, the less their ratings of rumination and depression. Arguably disrupted activities
may not be the only factors related to differences in rumination and mood ratings. The
findings are, however, consistent with predicted links between goal non-attainment and
rumination in a natural setting. The findings also minor Mcintosh & Martin's (1992) and
Koole et al's (1999) findings that goal attainment, whether through positive feedback, self
40
affirmation or resuming activities, is associated with lower levels of rumination. Further the
results also demonstrate predicted differences in mood.
In relation to questions about depression, the studies above are limited by their reliance on non
clinical samples which limits the extent to which findings can be generalised to a clinical
population. No attempt was made in the reaction time experiments to follow up this
assessment of information accessibility with an assessment of rumination about the specific
goal (e.g. intelligence / thought control) to confinn the presumed link. Many of the studies
are correlational thus only tentative conclusions can be drawn about the direction of
relationships: specifically whether goal linking generates or is generated by rumination.
Mcintosh & Martin's analysis, suggesting rumination mediates the relationship between goal
linking and unhappiness, did begin to consider such questions. Similar difficulties exist,
however, in making interpretations about the relationship between rumination and mood in the
literature focusing on rumination. Despite these common limits, the studies provide evidence,
which supports the goal progress and linkage models tenant, of a role of goal non-attainment
and linking in rumination and negative affect The next section will consider findings of
parallels between the goal progress view of rumination and hemisphere specialisation.
1.2.3. Relationships between hemispheric function, goalprogress & rumination.
Martin, Shira and Startup (2004) report further support for goal progress theory from studies
suggesting that right hemisphere activity is associated with efforts to progress with goals and
rumination.
The following question is considered: what general skills do people need to make progress
towards a goal? To accomplish the goal people need to a) remain focused on the goal even in
the face of distraction and frustration and b) to change strategies when initial efforts are not
working. It appears that these two functions are associated with left and right hemisphere
functioning respectively (Martin et al., 2004). Thus left hemisphere activity enhances rapid
41
execution of routine thinking, is thought to be based on set internal representations (e.g.
schema / scripts) and facilitates repression of distractions. In contrast right hemisphere
activity promotes awareness of external influences and distractions, detects anomalies and
activates information that deviates from routine representations. Left hemisphere activation is
thought to better assist execution of responses to predictable situations. Right hemisphere
activation is thought to detect when routine responses are no longer working and make new
information available. Thus right hemisphere functioning is thought to be involved in a
ruminative search for alternative routes to a goal (Martin et al., 2004).
Studies involving participants who have experienced brain damage and healthy participants
indicate that: left hemisphere activity facilitates routine processing while right hemisphere
activity supports shifting from the dominant response and changing strategy (see Burgess &
Simpson, 1988; Rauch, 1977); the right hemisphere is more active in generating novel
responses to new challenges (see Gordon & Cannon, 1976; Fink et al., 1999); and that the
right hemisphere is more active in keeping unsolved, goal related, infonnation in mind
(Bowden & Beeman, 1998).
For example in one study Bowden and Beeman (1998) showed participants three cue words
(e.g. high, district & house) and asked them to generate a fourth word that could be
meaningfully paired with each cue word (e.g. school). The cue words were presented either in
participants left or right visual field, and thus to either their right or left hemisphere
respectively. Participants were then shown words, to both hemispheres, that either did or did
not provide a solution - participants were asked to name this word and their response times
measured. They found that for problems that participants managed to solve: solution words
were named just as quickly when presented to right or left hemisphere. For problems that
participants failed to solve, they named solutions quickly only when information was
presented to the right. Thus while information related to solved problems was active in both
hemispheres, infonnation relating to unsolved problems was active only in the right. Martin
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et al (2004) suggest that the right hemisphere maintains activation relevant to unattained goals
(Zeigarnik effect).
In a follow up study Bowden and Beeman 1998 investigated whether right hemisphere
activation would facilitate problem solving. The same study was repeated except that rather
than naming the solution/non-solution words, participants were asked to decide whether or not
the presented word was a solution or not. Participants were able to identify words as solutions
more quickly when problems were presented to the right hemisphere compared with the left.
The findings suggest that right hemisphere activation helped participants in identifying a
solution and is arguably consistent with the goal progress suggestion of the functionality of
mmination.
Martin et al (2004) conclude that from a goal progress perspective, when information relating
to goal progress is positive, the left hemisphere is successfully responding to demands and no
rumination occurs. When information suggests goal progress is threatened, the right
hemisphere is activated, in an effort to generate an alternative strategy. If an alternative
solution is found, the dominant left hemisphere activity resumes and rumination ceases. If
new strategies are not found however or are unhelpful, the right hemisphere remains activated
- keeping goal related information live and facilitating rumination.
Collectively studies provide convergent evidence for links between rumination, right
hemisphere activation and elements of the goal progress model (see Martin, Shira & Startup,
2004 for a more detailed review). Significantly, right hemisphere activation has also been
found to be associated with other relevant factors including greater depression (Tomarken &
Keener 1998), greater negative emotion (Merckelbach & Van Open, 1989) and slowing of
action (Tucker & Williamson, 1984).
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1.2.4 Summary
The points addressed thus far, in discussion of goal linking and rumination, are summarized
below. Goal progress theory (Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996; Martin et al, 1993) views
rumination as the tendency to think repeatedly about unattained goals, in an attempt to make
progress. Rumination is triggered when people perceive that they have failed to attain, or
make sufficient progress towards, a goal and continues until progress is made or the person
gives up the goal. The model proposes that a mechanism underlying rumination is that
information related to unattained goals remains in mind for longer, is more accessible and
gives rise to rumination, an example of the Zeigarnik effect. The authors acknowledge that
while rumination may serve a self-regulatory function, it does not always result in goal
progress, nor in the goal being relinquished.
Within the context of goal linking, it is proposed that goals are structured in hierarchies. The
subjectivity of some hierarchies (e.g. does being one's ideal weight really lead to self worth?)
means that people respond differently to the same event and only some may perceive a goal
threat. Threats to higher order goals are more likely to result in rumination. Goal linking
describes the tendency to link the achievement or failure of low order goals (e.g. going on a
date) to the achievement or failure of higher order goals (being loved). People differ in their
tendency to goal link and linkers maintain that low level goals are necessary in the attainment
of higher order goals. Linking can be viewed as another form ofmetacognition. The model
suggests that linking causes people to ruminate in response to threats to low level goals as the
threat is perceived as an obstacle to higher order goals. Rumination in turn is associated with
low mood and depression. Rumination is thought to mediate the relationship between linking
and negative affect. Objective life events are poor predictors of happiness but perhaps linkers
base their beliefs on culturally shared theory.
Supportive evidence for elements of goal progress theory was provided by Martin et al (1993)
and Koole et al (1999) who demonstrated that failure to attain higher order goals was
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associated with increased accessibility of goal related information, presumed to reflect
rumination. This effect was reduced by positive feedback and self affirmation that facilitate
goal progress. Mcintosh and Martin's (1992) findings were consistent with hierarchy
assumptions and the proposal that rumination is a function of unattained goals. They
demonstrated that a tendency to goal link is associated with greater rumination, negative affect
and unhappiness. The study provided some support that rumination mediates between linking
and unhappiness. Millar et al's (1988) finding that the more unattained goals people
experience the greater their reported rumination and depression further highlights links
between goal linking and negative mood. Finally, convergent evidence from studies of
hemisphere functioning suggest that the right hemisphere is more active both in efforts to
progress goals and rumination. Studies suggest that the right hemisphere activity facilitates
changing strategies (Burgess & Simpson, 1988), generating novel solutions (Fink et al., 1999),
retaining unsolved information and identifying solutions (Bowden & Beeman, 1998). It is
less clear to what extent increased right hemisphere activation may remain functional, given
associations of right hemisphere activation with greater depression (Tomarken & Keener,
1998) and slowed action (Tucker & Williamson, 1984); particularly as depression is
characterised by difficulty in making progress or relinquishing goals and a sense of becoming
stuck. The next section will consider studies which further explore relationships between goal
linking, rumination and depression but in the context of daily hassles and life events.
1.3. Goal Linking, Daily Hassles and Life Events.
1.3.1 Daily Hassles
Daily hassles can be defined as everyday, mundane irritants and stressors that are experienced
as inconvenient or harassing (Kohn & Macdonald, 1992; Oxford University Press: New
Oxford Dictionary of English, 2001). Examples include time pressure, financial difficulties,
problems at work and being taken advantage of by others. It is well established that hassles
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and stressful events can have a detrimental impact both on people's physical and mental
health. Thus more frequent daily hassles are associated with greater mental distress and
physical complaints (e.g. Kohn et al., 1994a; Nakano, 1989; Kanner et al., 1981), though this
finding does not always emerge (Baer et al., 1987). Positive relationships have been found
between daily hassles and difficulties including depression (Jung & Khalsa, 1989) and trait
anxiety (Kohn & Gurevich, 1993).
Importantly, the onset of depression has been associated with relatively minor everyday
hassles as well as more major life events such as divorce or losing a job (Kanner et ai., 1981).
Perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, some studies find that daily hassles are more strongly
related to wellbeing and than major life events (Kanner et al., 1981; Holahan & Holahan,
1987; Russell & Davey, 1993). Some authors have suggested that the impact ofmore major
life events on well being is mediated through daily hassles, for example due to disruption of
social relationships and patterns of activity following a life event (Eckenrode, 1984; Kanner et
al., 1981). Kohn & Macdonald (1992) report that Wagner et al (1988) found a good
quantitative match between their data and a model based on this causal relationship between
life events and daily hassles. Other studies, however, strongly suggest that life events and
daily hassles predict health related outcomes independently (Chamberlain & Zika ,1990).
Mcintosh et al (1995; 1997) suggest that perhaps one reason why everyday hassles, as well a
major life events, can lead to depression is related to goal linking and subjective hierarchies.
Specifically, people with a tendency to goal link, may perceive small everyday hassles as
threats to higher order life goals. They illustrate, for example, that someone who goal links
may inteipret a small argument with a friend as a threat to the friendship as a whole, or to their
social life generally and the higher order goal of being accepted. According to this hypothesis
people who goal link will be more vulnerable to rumination and depression when faced with
relatively minor everyday hassles. So while Marco and Suls (1993) report that many daily
hassles impact people only over the short term (24hrs), linkers who ruminate in response to
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minor hassles may experience longer term detrimental effects on mood compared with people
who do not interpret hassles as a threat to higher order goals. These questions were addressed
in a study by Mcintosh, Harlow and Martin (1995) detailed below.
1.3.2 Mcintosh, Harlow & Martin (1995) - Key Study
Mcintosh, Harlow and Martin (1995) describe a study that is particularly relevant to the
questions asked by the current study. The authors examined the impact of goal linking in
undergraduate students in relation to their experience of daily hassles. Their hypothesis was
that people who link the attainment or blocking of lower order goals (e.g. being ideal weight)
to higher order goals (e.g. happiness) would be more likely to interpret daily hassles as threats
to higher order goals and consequently would experience a greater impact of hassles on their
mood.
Based on assessment with Mcintosh and Martin's Linking Inventory (Mcintosh & Martin,
1992), 45 student participants were grouped on their dispositional tendency to link attainment
of lower order goals to higher order goals. On two occasions, two weeks apart, participants
completed a battery of self report measures assessing rumination, number of daily hassles
experienced in the preceding two weeks, depression level and physical symptoms of
depression.
At session one, participants with a tendency to goal link (linkers) experienced greater
rumination, depression and physical symptoms than non-linkers. Consistent with the
hypothesis, at session two linkers who experienced a high level of hassles at session one
reported greater depression and physical complaints than non-linkers or linkers with few
hassles. Non-linkers mood and physical symptoms were unrelated to hassles. The study
replicates Mcintosh and Martin's earlier finding (1992) of greater rumination in people who
link lower and higher order goals relative to those who do not; provides further support for a
goal progress view of rumination and suggests that goal linking may be related to rumination
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and depression. It is uncertain if goal linking is a cause or consequence of rumination, or if
both are caused by a third variable. The authors make a further tentative suggestion that
perhaps hassles predict depression only for people who experience frequent hassles which
they perceive as a major event. A related study has also examined goal linking in the context
ofmore major life events considered below.
1.3.3 Life Events
In contrast to daily hassles, life events involve greater change, adjustment or disruption. In
one of the earliest measures of life events, the Schedule of Recent
Experiences (SRE: Holmes & Rahe, 1967) life events are referred to as any event or
occurrence that involves significant change and readjustment (Holmes & Rahe, 1967; Harris,
1997), the significance of events being based on people's subjective judgements. Examples
include an estrangement, new child or death. As noted above, major life events, like daily
hassles, are frequently considered as one factor associated with onset of psychological
distress, including depression (Brown et al., 1978; 1995) and physical health difficulties (e.g.
chronic fatigue syndrome Theorell et al., 1999; stroke, House et al., 1990). With life events,
however, there appears more debate within the literature regarding the accuracy of their
measurement and strength of association.
While many studies report associations between more frequent and severe life events and the
onset of mental health difficulties and physical illness (Bennett 2003), the strength of
association is often found to be weak, particularly in relation to physical health (Lin et al.,
1979; Kanner et al., 1981). This has led to the consideration noted above that the cumulative
effects of minor hassles may be more strongly associated with distress than life events
(Kanner et al., 1981).
While life events show weaker associations with distress than daily hassles, associations have
been detected. For example, in a series of studies by Brown & Harris (1978; Brown et al.,
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1995), women both in in-patient and community settings identified major life events as one
factor contributing to depression onset, as assessed using the Life Events and Difficulties
Schedule interview (Brown & Harris, 1978). It is fully acknowledged that life events
represent only one of a wide range of factors that contribute to difficulties, other factors
including individual vulnerability factors (e.g. lack of a supportive partner, loss of mother
before age 11). Later studies further identified negative life events associated with depression
as those involving loss of valued ideals, people or objects and loss associated with
humiliation, death or feeling trapped (Brown, Harris & Hepworth, 1995).
In contrast, Bergh et al (2005) surveyed the prevalence of a number of factors among people
who frequently attend primary health care services compared with those with average
attendance. One factor was life events, assessed using a condensed version of Holmes and
Rahe's Social Readjustment Rating Scale. To counter criticisms, the scale was supplemented
by asking participants to rate the significance of the event to them. In this study frequent
attenders did not experience more frequent life events than regular attenders, nor did they
report being more affected by these life events. Overall, while Life events may represent only
a small component in the variance of onset or maintenance of physical and mental distress it
would still seem valuable to consider. A further study by Mcintosh, Martin and Jones
addresses the influence of thoughts about life events on goal linking and happiness
judgements.
1.3.4 Life Events & Goal Linking
Mcintosh, Martin and Jones (1997) studied the impact of goal linking and reflecting on life
events on undergraduate students' ratings of their long tenn happiness. They hypothesized
that people who goal link, who believe that higher order goals (e.g. happiness) are contingent
on attaining lower order goals, would be more influenced by thinking about life events when
judging their long tenn happiness, than people who do not goal link. Firstly, 87 participants
were either asked to think and write about a negative life event from their past, or a positive
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life event from their past, or a negative current life event or a positive current life event.
Participants then gave ratings of their estimated happiness on a scale from 1-10. Finally
participants completed Mcintosh and Martin's (1992, 2001) linking inventory to assess their
dispositional tendency to goal link. Consistent with expectation, while linkers' ratings of
happiness differed significantly depending on whether they wrote about negative or positive
events, non linkers' ratings ofhappiness were unrelated to writing about life events.
Thus when life events occur, people who goal link may be more vulnerable to perceive life
events as a threat to higher order goals, to their happiness and as previously discussed may
experience greater rumination and depression. In the context of the literature on daily hassles
and life events, it would be interesting to consider further the relative impact of each on goal
linking and rumination.
1.4 Research Aim, Question & Hypotheses
1.4.1. Research Aim
While Mcintosh et al (1992; 1995; 1997; 2001) have explored relationships between goal
linking, daily hassles, life events, rumination and depression within undergraduate student
populations, it seems that to date these relationships have not been extensively studied within
a clinical population, limiting the extent to which findings can be translated to people's
experience of clinical depression. The main aim of this study therefore is to explore if people
with clinical depression respond to daily hassles with rumination as a function of their
tendency to goal link, as observed in students with lower mood (Mcintosh et al., 1995). A
secondary aim is to determine if these relationships are specific to depression or observed in
people experiencing other forms of psychological distress. Understanding goal linking within
a clinical sample would lend weight to research on targeting beliefs about goals and
metacognitions in the treatment of depression.
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1.4.2 Research question and Hypotheses
Main Question: Do people with clinical depression respond to daily hassles with rumination
as a function of their tendency to goal link?
Hypothesis 1. People with clinical depression will experience similar levels of daily hassles
and life events to a comparison clinical group of people with psychological difficulties other
than depression.
Hypothesis 2. People with clinical depression, however, will demonstrate a greater tendency
to goal link and greater rumination
Hypothesis 3. A non clinical comparison group of people with no history of clinical
depression will experience (a) fewer daily hassles and life events than clinical groups, (b) less
rumination and will have a lower tendency to goal link.




The study took the form of a cross-sectional, between subjects design in which the responses
of three independent groups were compared. A clinical sample of people experiencing major
depression; a clinical sample of people experiencing other psychological difficulties but not
major depression and a non-clinical, never depressed, sample from the general population
were compared on the six self-report questionnaires detailed below. The independent variable
was major depression and the dependent variables were goal linking, rumination, daily
hassles, life events and mood. The design was chosen to enable comparison of any group
differences in participants' degree of goal linking, rumination, daily hassles and life events -
specifically to compare people with and without clinical depression.
2.1.1 Ethical considerations
The research design was given favourable ethical approval by Highland NHS Board Local
Research Ethics Committee and management approval by NHS Highland Research and
Development (appendix 1). The main ethical issues considered in the application were
minimizing potential distress to participants and ensuring participant confidentiality and
informed consent.
To minimize the likelihood of distress, measures were chosen that have previously been used
in clinical and research settings with no published reports of difficulties. In the event of
participants becoming distressed the researcher was available to offer support at the time or
offer alternative support if required. In the event of participant's disclosing information that
indicated a need for support with a particular mental health issue, participants would be
encouraged to disclose this infonnation to the professional currently supporting them or to
their GP. Participants were made aware that if they indicated that their, or someone else's,
52
safety was at risk then the researcher would notify the relevant agencies. Participants were
also informed that they could withdraw from the study at any point without explanation or
penalty.
To ensure confidentiality, questionnaires and interviews were coded and stored anonymously
and securely. All identifiable information, such as the consent form, was stored separately
from questionnaires and interview schedules. To ensure informed consent, participants were
provided with the participant information sheet, time to consider whether or not they wished
to participate, opportunity to ask questions and all participants were required to sign the
consent form.
2.1.2 Power Calculation
The number of participants to be recruited in each group was estimated using a statistical
power calculation. Rumination and mood have previously been shown to clearly differentiate
between people with depression and those without (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004). Since
rumination is associated with goal-linking, a large difference and effect size was anticipated
between groups on this primary measure. David Clark-Carter (2004) reports statistical power
tables based on measures suggested by Cohen (1992). These power tables indicate that for a
between subjects analysis of variance (df =2), 22 participants in each condition would be
required to detect a large effect size, where power is 0.8 and significance level is p=0.05.
Thus the aim was to recruit 22 participants in each group.
2.1.3 Literature Search Strategy
The study's design was based on the review of the literature previously introduced. The
literature search took the following format. Regular literature searches were made using a
range of Ovid Technologies databases for example: PsychlNFO, Medline, EMBASE, Ovid
full text and CINAHL. Searches were made using combinations of the following key terms:
rumination; daily hassles; life events; depression / affect / mood; goal linking, goal beliefs,
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goal progress, linking, happiness; self-focused attention, depressive self-focus and overgeneral
autobiographical memory. Further searches were carried out for articles and chapters by
specific authors: Mcintosh, W.D.; Martin, L.L.; Nolen-Hoeksema, S.; Teasdale, J.D.,
Watkins, E. & Baracaia, S.; Pyszczynski, T. & Greenberg, J. and Papageorgiou, C. & Wells,
A. The references of key papers and books (e.g. including Mcintosh, Harlow & Martin, 1995;
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004) were reviewed and related articles followed up. As related
topics emerged (e.g. adaptive self-reflection), the relevant literature was searched for using the
databases above. Current and past issues of specific journals (e.g. Journal of Applied Social
Psychology) were scanned for related articles. Discussion of topics with the supervising
psychologist generated further related areas of literature to follow up.
2.2 Participants
2.2.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Participants were recruited from one site, NHS Highland, and had to meet the following
inclusion and exclusion criteria. All participants were adults aged 18 years up to 65 years.
Participants were excluded from the study if they lacked English comprehension; had known
current co-morbid drug or alcohol problems; had known organic pathology; learning
disability; or formal diagnosis of personality disorder or bipolar mood disorder. Inclusion and
exclusion criteria specific to each group are detailed below.
Participants in the clinical depression group were required to meet the diagnostic criteria for a
current major depressive episode as determined using the mood disorders section of the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-CV for DSM-IV: First, Spitzer, Gibbon and
Williams, 1996). To retain distinct groups, adults experiencing low mood but not major
depression were excluded from this group. Given the high level of co-morbidity between
depression and anxiety, anxiety symptoms were not criteria for exclusion.
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Participants in the other psychological difficulties group were adults who had been referred to
psychological services for emotional difficulties (e.g. anxiety, anger) where depression was
not the main complaint and who did not currently meet DSM-IV criteria for major depression
as determined using the mood disorders section of the SCID.
Participants in the non-clinical control group were adults who were not currently experiencing
major depression and had no history of major depression as determined from the screening
SCID-IV interview. Control participants were not currently experiencing any other fonn of
emotional distress for which they had sought professional help.
2.2.2 Source andmethod ofrecruitment - Clinical Samples
Potential participants for the major depression and other psychological difficulties groups
were identified from primary care and community mental health team referrals to the clinical
psychology service waiting lists of a busy adult psychology service in the north of Scotland.
Potential participants were approached initially by letter (appendix 2). The letter was
accompanied by an information sheet introducing the study (appendix 3) and a copy of the
consent form (appendix 4). Participants who were willing to consider taking part were asked
to contact the researcher by telephone, or by returning a stamped addressed envelope with
their contact details. Those interested were contacted by the researcher, by telephone, to
provide an opportunity for participants to ask any questions about the study. If a potential
participant wished to take part in the research, a time was arranged for them to meet with the
researcher, either at the psychology department or the participant's home. During this single
meeting, participants gave written informed consent (appendix 4), were given the screening
SCID interview to establish if they met the criteria for major depression or not and completed
the questionnaires outlined below. Invitations were sent to 230 clinical participants and 55
interviews were carried out. 47 clinical participants met the criteria: 22 with major depression
and 25 with other psychological difficulties.
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2.2.3 Source and method ofrecruitment - Non-clinical control sample
A convenience sample of never depressed control participants were recruited through
associates of the author. Control participants were approached in person or by letter and
provided with the information sheet about the study, a copy of the consent form and an
opportunity to ask questions. As before, if a potential participant wished to take part, a time
was arranged to meet with the researcher at a familiar and private setting (e.g. psychology
department or home visit). At the single meeting participants gave written, informed consent
(appendix); were screened using the SCID-IV to confirm that they were neither currently
experiencing, nor had any history of, major depression; and subsequently completed the
questionnaires outlined below. 25 participants were invited to attend, 23 interviews were
carried out and all 23 participants met the criteria.
2.3 Measures
2.3.1 Demographic Information
Brief demographic information on age, date of birth and gender were collected.
2.3.2 Mood Disorders Subsection of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV - Clinical
Version (SCID -CVfor DSM-IV: First, Spitzer, Gibbon & Williams, 1996)
The mood disorder section of the SCID-CV (appendix 5) was used to confirm the presence or
absence ofmajor depression. The SCID is a structured interview schedule within which the
diagnostic criteria for all axis I diagnostic categories in DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders: American Psychiatric Association, 1994) are covered. The
whole SCID interview was not administered, for brevity and to reduce demands on
participants. The mood disorder section includes 15 questions to assess the specific DSM-IV
diagnostic criteria for a major depressive episode. Past history questions within the SCID
were used to establish no previous episodes of depression among participants in the non¬
clinical sample. In the current study a random sample of 9 (13%) SCID interview tapes were
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independently reviewed by a qualified clinical psychologist, experienced in administering the
SCID. There was 100% agreement, regarding the presence or absence of major depression in
participants, between the researcher and the qualified psychologist, confirming inter-rater
reliability.
The SCID interview is a common screening tool in research studies and has been found to
possess good reliability and validity in the diagnosis of Axis I disorders (Spitzer et al., 1992).
Specifically, Zanarini et al (2000) found good inter-rater reliability (Kappa=0.80) and fair
test-retest reliability (Kappa=0.61) in diagnosing Major Depressive Disorder using SCID for
DSM-IV. Lam, Smith, Checkley, Rijsdijk and Sham (2003) found 100% independent
agreement between the SCID interview and a clinical diagnosis ofmajor depressive disorder.
Several studies (Basco et al., 2000; Fenning et al., 1994) evidence superior validity of the
SCID over standard clinical interviews at intake episode. Some studies have used the SCID to
provide a "gold standard" in determining the accuracy of clinical diagnoses (Shear et al.,
2000).
2.3.3 The Linking Inventory (Mcintosh andMartin 1992)
The Linking Inventory (appendix 6) is a 13 item, forced choice, questionnaire that measures
the extent to which participants believe that higher order goals (e.g. their happiness) are
dependent on the outcome of lower order goals (e.g. being an ideal weight). For example, one
item asks "Does being outgoing affect your happiness?" Participants then choose between
responses a) "I would be happier if I was more outgoing" or b) "I would be about as happy as
I am right now if I was more outgoing". The authors indicate that response a) represents a
linking perspective while response b) represents a non-linking perspective. The measure is
used to assess the extent to which participants link lower order with higher order goals. The
item scores range from 0-13 with higher scores representing greater linking. Previous studies
have categorized participants scoring 0-6 as non-linkers and those scoring 7-13 as linkers
(Mcintosh, Martin and Jones, 1997). The Inventory was developed by Mcintosh and Martin
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(1992) and the authors report that the linking scale had demonstrated reasonable internal
reliability (alpha=0.73) and test-retest reliability (r=0.78) (Mcintosh, Martin and Jones, 1997).
The authors have employed the measure in a series of studies (Mcintosh and Martin, 1992;
Mcintosh, Harlow and Martin, 1995; Mcintosh, 1996; Mcintosh et al., 2001) that have
detected significant group differences in linking. Further, Martin, Mcintosh, Chen, Scott-
West and Chang (1996) suggest that while linking is related to rumination and negative affect,
it does not correlate with a tendency to make internal, stable or global attributions for negative
events (Peterson et al., 1982); nor is it related to locus of control (Rotter, 1966) or other
related constructs. While linking is related to neuroticism it is not redundant with neuroticism
(Martin et al., 1996). Collectively the evidence is consistent with the linking scale's validity
as measure of a construct related but distinct from rumination and negative affect.
2.3.4 The Short Response Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson 2001)
The Short Response Style Questionnaire consists of 10 items; drawn from the 22 item
Ruminative Response Sub-Scale (RRS), of the original Response Style Questionnaire (RSQ
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). The SRSQ assesses participants' tendency to ruminate in
response to depressed mood (appendix 7). The items represent aspects of rumination as
described by Nolen-Hoeksema (1991), specifically: focus on emotions, focus on self-
evaluations, focus on the consequences of depressive symptoms and questions on reasons for
being depressed. For example, item one is "I think about how alone I feel". Participants rate
the frequency of each response to depressed mood on a four-point Likert scale ranging from
"never" to "always". Total scores range from 10 to 40 with higher scores representing more
frequent rumination.
The RRS has evidenced high internal reliability (alpha=0.88 to 0.92: Just & Alloy, 1997;
Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson and Grayson, 1999), test-retest reliability (r= 0.80 after 6 months
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Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker & Larson, 1994) and, though sometimes questioned, predictive
validity is evident in many studies (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).
The ten item scale was derived by selecting items from the RRS that had the highest item-total
correlations with the full-scale RSQ. Reports indicate (Luminet, 2004) that the short version
is highly related to the full version of the scale (r=0.90) and has high internal reliability (alpha
= 0.85). While the construct validity and test-retest reliability of the short version have yet to
be demonstrated, the scales correlation with the RSQ supports its validity as a measure of
rumination. The brevity of the short version was also a consideration in designing the study to
minimize the collective demands on participants.
2.3.5 The Survey ofRecent Life Experiences (SRLE Kohn & MacDonald 1992)
The SRLE is a self-report measure of daily hassles in adults. The condensed scale consists of
a checklist of 41 items, from the original 51, that relate to social and cultural difficulties,
difficulties at work, time pressure, financial issues, obstacles to social acceptability and social
victimization. Participants indicate the extent to which they have experienced each hassle
over the past month on a four-point scale from "l=not at all part ofmy life" to "4=veiy much
part ofmy life" (appendix 8). Total scores range from 41-164 with higher scores representing
greater experience of everyday hassles.
The authors report that the SRLE demonstrates adequate reliability and validity: the alpha
reliability of the SRLE was high (alpha=0.92, p<0.01). The SRLE correlated highly with the
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS, 0.57, p<0.01), a reliable, valid and widely used measure of
subjectively experienced stress, supporting its validity as a measure of hassles. The short
form (41 items) of the SRLE is only marginally less reliable than the 51 item version (alpha
=0.90) and also correlates (0.55, p<0.01) with the PSS. The value ofminimizing participant
demands was considered, on balance, to justify use of the short version. Further, reports
indicate that the measure is relatively free from contamination by participants' response to
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stress; a frequently cited criticism leveled at the most commonly used Hassles Scale (Kanner
et al., 1981). Majella de Jong, Timmerman and Emmelkamp (1996) further evaluated the
psychometric properties of the SRLE with a Dutch population and conclude that the SRLE is
a highly reliable and cross-culturally valid measure of daily hassles.
2.3.6 The condensed version of the Social Readjustment Rating Scale (Life Changes List)
(SRRSHolmes & Rahe 1967)
The life events measure employed was a condensed version of the original life change list
developed by Holmes and Rahe (1967). The list is comprised of 14 of the most serious life
changes and includes major changes in personal and family relationships, work, residential
and financial situation (appendix 9). Participants were asked to indicate, "yes" or "no", if any
of the listed life events had occurred during the last two years. Following previous studies
(e.g. Theorell, Blomkvist, Lindh and Evengard, 1999) that employed this measure, the
researcher clarified, giving an example, the difference between long term difficulties and life
events/ life changes to ensure that the items participants endorsed reflected life events.
Participant's total scores ranged from 0-14. A scaled score was derived by summing the
weighting values assigned to each item on the original life change list. These values reflect
estimates of the degree of readjustment each event demands (Holmes and Rahe, 1967).
Participants then rated their subjective experience of the impact of each event they endorsed
on a five-point rating scale from "1= affected me in a very positive way" to "5=affected me in
a very negative way". These supplementary questions have been used in a number of recent
Swedish studies (Theorell et al., 1999; Bergh, Baigi, Fridlund and Marklund, 2005), in
conjunction with the condensed version of the SRRS, with the aim of reflecting the
significance of life events to the individual.
The Social Readjustment Rating Scale is one of the most widely used measures of stressful
life events (Hock, 1995) and perhaps consequently has also been widely criticized. Criticisms
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include possible confounding from inclusion of items that could result from stress as well as
contribute to it. Despite such criticisms, Scully, Tosi and Banning (2000) review the rating
scale and literature, concluding that criticisms are as yet unequivocal and that the measure
remains a robust measure of life events. Evidence of the temporal stability of the measure
was found by Gerst et al (1978). Psychiatric out-patients and non-patients rank ordered the
degree of readjustment required by life events on three occasions, over two years, showing a
high degree of consistency (r= 0.96-0.89 for control participants, and r=0.91-0.70 for the
patient sample). Convergent evidence for the validity of the short fonn of the SRRS, though
limited, comes from recent studies in which the measure has found significant differences
between samples on life events (e.g. Theorell et al., 1999). In designing the study, inclusion
of this briefmeasure was considered a helpful marker of life events, while keeping participant
demands to a minimum.
2.3.7 Centerfor Epidemiological Studies - Depression (CES-D Radloff1977)
To assess current level of depressive symptomatology, the Center for Epidemiological
Studies-Depression Scale was employed (CES-D Radloff 1977). In comparison to measures
specifically designed to detect features of clinical depression, the CES-D was developed for
assessing depression in the general population, and thus felt to be a sensitive measure of
depression among both control and clinical sample participants. The CES-D consists of 20
items of both clinical and normal symptoms with an emphasis on the cognitive and affective
elements of depression (appendix 10). Items include "You felt you could not shake off the
blues even with help from family or friends". Participants rate how often they have
experienced each item during the past week on a four-point Likert scale from "0= rarely or
none of the time(less than one day)" to "3=most or all of the time (5-7 days)". Total scores
range from 0 to 60, with higher scores indicating higher depressive symptoms.
The CES-D is widely used in both research and clinical settings (Thase and Lang, 2004).
Reliability and validity of the CES-D have been assessed in general and clinical populations
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(Radloff, 1977; Hann, Winter & Jacobsen, 1999). Reports indicate that the internal reliability
of the CES-D is highly satisfactory within the general population (alpha=0.85) and psychiatric
population (alpha = 0.90). Test-retest reliability was satisfactory ranging from 0.51 to 0.67
over a 2 to 8 week period. The CES-D demonstrated significant correlations with other
measures of depression (e.g. Hamilton Clinican's rating scale, 1960) supporting the
convergent validity of the scale. Construct validity was established from differences between
psychiatric inpatients and the general population.
2.3.8 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS Zigmond & Snaith 1983)
The HADS is a widely used scale to assess anxiety and depression. The scale is composed of
14 items divided into two subscales measuring anxiety (A-scale) and depression (D-Scale),
which are scored separately (appendix 11). Participants rate the extent to which they have
experienced each symptom, in the previous week, on a scale from 0-3. Scores on each
subscale range from 0-21 with higher scores representing greater anxiety or depression.
Scores of 11 or greater are considered to reflect clinical levels of distress.
A frequently cited advantage of the HADS is that the scale avoids items that focus on
physical aspects of depression (e.g. appetite, sleep), which may yield artificially inflated
scores among clients experiencing physical illness. It is common that people referred to
psychology services experience additional physical illness, thus this feature of the HADS may
be advantageous. The depression scale focuses on affective elements of depression. A further
advantage for this study is that the scale briefly combines a measure of both mood and
anxiety. Given the high co-morbidity of anxiety and depression it was thought helpful to
include a measure of anxiety in addition to mood.
The HADS has demonstrated satisfactory to good internal consistency and test-retest
reliability (Moorey et al., 1991; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983; Clark and Fallowfield, 1986). In
a recent literature review of the HADS validity based on 747 papers, Bjelland, Dahl, Haug and
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Neckelmann (2002) found evidence of good internal consistency. Cronbach's alpha
coefficients all exceeded 0.6 with mean Cronbach's alpha for HADS-A at 0.83 and for
HADS-D at 0.82.
Though reports vary, a number of factor-analytic studies provide support for the construct
validity of the two anxiety and depression scales (Bennett, 2003; Moorey et al., 1991).
Bjelland et al (2002) found most studies (11/19) reporting factor analysis ofHADS found a 2
factor structure supporting independent dimensions of anxiety and depression. Further,
significant correlations have been found in several studies between the two subscales and
independent assessments of anxiety and depression (Bramley et al., 1988; Aylard et al., 1987;
Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). Bjelland et al (2002) report good to very good concurrent
validity, with medium (0.49) to strong correlations (0.83) between the HADS and other
common assessments of anxiety and depression (e.g. Beck Depression Inventory, Beck et al.,
1961). The HADS has been found to show good face validity and participants, in research
and clinical settings, find the scale accessible (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983).
2.4 Procedure
The researcher met with participants in a private room in their own homes; in the psychology
department or, in the case of control participants, in another private and familiar setting. The
participant was presented with another copy of the information sheet and the researcher
highlighted the purpose of the study and confidentiality. The participant was given a further
opportunity to ask questions. The researcher reviewed a copy of the consent form, which the
participant had previously been sent, highlighting that participation is voluntary and the
participant could withdraw, without penalty, at any point (appendix 4). The participant then
provided written consent.
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Brief demographic information (age and gender, appendix 12) was collected and the
participant was asked if they would like to receive a summary of the research findings when
the study was completed. If so, the participant provided their postal address.
The participant was then administered the mood disorders subsection of the SCID - IV
interview to establish the presence or absence of major depression. A proportion of
participants (25%) consented to having this interview tape recorded for the purpose of
establishing inter-rater reliability. An explanation of the purpose of tape recording the
interview and confidentiality were discussed and the participant signed a further consent form
(appendix 4) prior to commencing the interview.
The participant was then taken through a pack of questionnaires with the researcher reading
aloud the instructions and items for each questionnaire and completing participant's
responses. The participant first completed the Linking Inventory and then the Ruminative
Response Scale. Next the participant was presented with the Survey of Recent Life
Experiences and then the Social Readjustment Rating Scale. The participant then completed
the CES-Depression and finally the HADS.
Following completion of the questionnaires the participant was thanked for taking part in the
study and given a full explanation of the study's hypotheses. The researcher asked the
participant about their experience of taking part in the study including whether they had found
any aspect distressing. No participant found the process to be unduly distressing and all
responded positively to the study's aims. For each participant the procedure took an average
of 50 minutes. Consent forms and participant addresses were stored separately from the
interview schedules and measures to ensure participant anonymity. Participant's data was
allocated a code for entry to the database. The outcome of the SCID interview determined




Data was analysed using SPSS for Windows (version 10). In the first stage of primary
analysis, hypotheses 1-3 were explored using a series of one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA), for between group comparisons, with three levels of group (depressed, other
difficulties, never depressed) as the independent variable. This enabled detection of any
significant group differences across the main dependent variables: linking; rumination, daily
hassles, life events and mood. Group differences were then unpacked using post-hoc
Bonferroni T-tests for multiple comparisons.
In the second stage of analysis, a series of one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with
three levels of group as the independent variable were employed to further explore the study's
overall question. The impact of the main dependent variables, goal linking and rumination, on
group were explored when the effect of other variables (daily hassles, impact of life events,
rumination and goal linking) were partialled out. To consider question 4, the relative impact
of hassles and life events, Pearson's r correlations and partial correlations were carried out on
hassles, impact of life events, rumination and goal linking data from the whole sample.
Finally, to further explore the impact of goal linking, participants were divided into linkers
and non-linkers and one way ANOVA, ANCOVA, Pearson's r correlations and partial
correlations were performed with link type (linkers and non-linkers) as the independent




Seventy adults met the criteria for participation in the study, 36 women (51%) and 34 men
(49%) with a mean age of 40.0 years (SD 12.2; range 18 to 62 years). Table 1 shows the brief
demographic characteristics, age and gender, of participants within the depression, other
difficulties and never depressed control groups.
Table 1. Demographic characteristies ofparticipants by group
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Depressed Other Difficulties Never depressed
Number of participants n 22 25 23
Gender
Number of Female participants 13 12 11
Number ofMale participants 9 13 12
Age
Mean 42.1 42.8 35.1
Standard Deviation SD 12.0 12.7 10.7
Range (min-max) 18-59 18-62 24-60
As indicated, the depressed group consisted of 22 participants, 13 women and 9 men. The
other difficulties group consisted of 25 participants, 12 women and 13 men. The never
depressed group consisted of 23 participants, 11 women and 12 men, thus the groups were
considered to be gender balanced.
With respect to age, participants in the never depressed control group were found to be
slightly younger (mean age 35.1 years) than participants in the depressed (mean age 42.1
years) and other difficulties groups (mean age 42.8 years). A one way analysis of variance
(ANOVA), with three levels of group, revealed an age difference between groups that
approached significance (F (2, 67) = 2.99; p=0.057). However, a series of ANOVA tests for
age found no significant effect of age on any dependent variable; therefore the results below
are reported without age included as a covariate.
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For clarity, each stage of the analysis will be presented in sequence. Results will be discussed
in relation to the relevant hypotheses at each stage.
3.2. Primary Analysis
Hypotheses one to three were first explored using a series of one-way ANOVA, with three
levels of group, to ascertain the presence of any significant group differences across the main
dependent variables of goal linking, rumination, daily hassles, life events and mood. Table 2
shows the mean scores, range and standard deviations found on each outcome measure.
Table 2. Means, range and standard deviations from main outcome measures by group
Outcome Measure Group Mean Range (min - max) Standard Deviation
Total Linking Score 1 (depressed) 6.9 1-11 2.99
(0-13) 2 (other) 4.8 1-12 2.80
3 (control) 4.1 0-10 2.75
Total Rumination 1 (depressed) 31.5 24-40 4.28
(SRSQ 10-40) 2 (other) 23.2 16-38 5.46
3 (control) 19.4 11-29 4.70
Total Daily Hassles 1 (depressed) 90.5 58-138 18.06
(SRLE 41-164) 2 (other) 72.0 52-112 15.86
3 (control) 66.5 50-100 13.24
Total number of 1 (depressed) 4.1 0-8 2.01
Life Events (0-14) 2 (other) 3.8 0-7 1.83
3 (control) 2.8 0-7 1.78
Life Events Scaled 1 (depressed) 148.1 0-302 80.77
Score (0-600) 2 (other) 135.3 0-254 72.12
3 (control) 92.8 0-238 54.06
Total Impact of 1 (depressed) 16.0 0-31 8.76
Life Events (0-70) 2 (other) 13.0 0-24 5.94
3 (control) 8.3 0-25 6.34
Total CES-D score 1 (depressed) 39.5 10-57 11.70
(depression:0-60) 2 (other) 15.0 4-37 9.25
3 (control) 4.6 0-13 3.76
HADS-Anxiety 1 (depressed) 15.4 8-20 3.25
Total (0-21) 2 (other) 10.8 3-21 4.73
3 (control) 5.1 0-13 3.44
HADS-Depression 1 (depressed) 11.8 3-19 4.15
Total (0-21) 2 (other) 5.5 0-14 4.08
3 (control) 2.2 0-8 2.13
Prior to running the ANOVA analysis, histograms and box plots for each dependent variable
were examined, illustrating that distributions were a sufficient approximation ofnormality and
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equal variance to meet the assumptions for parametric analysis. While data derived from
questionnaires arguably falls between an ordinal and interval scale, research frequently
subjects data from questionnaires to parametric analysis. Further, it was considered that as
ANOVA is relatively robust with respect to these assumptions, any violation caused by
scaling would be small (Dancey & Reidy, 2004) and insufficient to prevent the use of the
more powerful ANOVA analysis. Thus overall the assumptions for use ofparametric analysis
were met.
The one-way ANOVAs revealed significant group differences on the following dependent
variables: total linking score (F (2, 67) = 5.767; p=0.005); rumination total (F (2, 67) =
35.778; p<0.001); hassles total (F (2, 67) = 14.325; p<0.001; life events scaled score (F (2, 67)
= 3.932; p=0.024); total impact of life events (F (2, 67) = 6.883; p=0.002); total CES-
Depression (F (2, 67) = 92.180; p<0.001); total HADS-anxiety (F (2, 67) = 39.292; p<0.001)
and total FTADS-depression (F (2, 67) =41.425; p<0.001).
There was no significant group difference for total number of life events (F (2, 67) = 2.848;
p=0.065) suggesting that there were no differences between the depression, other difficulties
or never depressed control group in the number of life events participants experienced in the
preceding two year period. The implication of these findings for the study's hypotheses will
be explored shortly below.
To unpack which group differences were being observed in the significant differences
detected by ANOVA, the data was subjected to post hoc, multiple comparisons using
Bonferroni T tests within SPSS. Performing multiple comparisons increases the risk of
making a Type I error, however Bonferroni incorporates a statistical adjustment to control for
multiple comparisons and remove the increased risk. Specifically, the Bonferroni correction
involves dividing the desired significance level, here 0.05, by the number of comparisons
being made. For example where three means are being compared, the Bonferroni adjusted
68
significance would be 0.05/3 = 0.016. To achieve significance at p<0.05, the probability of
each T value must be less than 0.016. Thus Bonferroni provides a conservative estimate of
significance and reduces the otherwise inflated likelihood of making a Type I error. Group
differences on mood and anxiety will be reported first, followed by differences on goal
linking, rumination, daily hassles and life events that relate to the hypotheses.
Post hoc comparisons revealed that all three groups, depressed, other difficulties and controls
differed significantly from each other on mood revealed by comparisons of both total CES-D
scores and total HADS-D scores. Thus CES-D scores for the depressed group were
significantly greater than for the other difficulties group (effect size d=2.35; mean diff 24.59,
SE 2.59; p<0.001) and the never depressed controls (effect size d=4.51; mean diff 34.89, SE
2.64; p<0.001). CES-D scores for the other difficulties group were significantly lower than
the depressed group (effect size d=2.35; mean diff -24.59, SE 2.59; p< 0.001) but significantly
higher than the never depressed control group (effect size d=T.58; mean diff 10.31, SE 2.56;
p< 0.001). Logically, CES-D scores for the never depressed control group were significantly
lower than both the depressed group (effect size d=4.51; mean diff -34.89, SE 2.64; pO.OOl)
and other difficulties group (effect size d=l .58; mean diff-10.31, SE 2.56; pO.OOl). Thus, as
expected, the three groups differed significantly on CES-D mood scores with the depression
group evidencing greatest low mood, the controls least low mood and other difficulties falling
in the middle. This pattern is reflected in mean CES-D scores. The mean CES-D score for
the depression group was 39.5 well above the CES-D threshold (24) for "severe" depressive
symptoms. The mean CES-D score for the other difficulties group was 15 falling within the
"mild" category and below the threshold for clinical symptomatology (16 & above). The
control group mean CES-D score was 4.6, falling within the lowest "not depressed" category.
Group differences on the CES-D were mirrored by results from the HADS-D. Thus HADS-D
scores for the depressed group were significantly higher than for the other difficulties (effect
size d=1.52; mean diff 6.25, SE 1.05; pO.OOl) and never depressed control groups (effect
size 3.06; mean diff 9.60, SE 1.07; p<0.001). HADS-D scores for the other difficulties group
were significantly lower than the depressed group (effect size d= 1.52; mean diff -6.25, SE
1.05; p<0.001) but significantly higher than the never depressed group (effect size d=1.08;
mean diff 3.35, SE1.04; p=0.006). As on the CES-D, the three groups differed significantly
on HADS-D mood scores with the depression group evidencing highest levels of low mood,
the controls least low mood and other difficulties group falling in the middle. These findings
support the successful manipulation of the independent variable (major depression) and
suggest that on mood the three groups were distinct.
Post hoc comparisons found significant differences between all three groups on HADS-A total
anxiety scores. Thus HADS-A scores for the depressed group were significantly higher than
for the other difficulties (effect size d=1.15; mean diff 4.57, SE 1.14; p<0.001) and never
depressed control groups (effect size d=3.07; mean diff 10.28, SE 1.16; p<0.001). HADS-A
scores for the other difficulties group were significantly lower than depressed group (effect
size d=1.15; mean diff -4.57, SE 1.14; p<0.001) but significantly higher than never depressed
controls (effect size d=1.40; mean diff 5.71, SE 1.13; p<0.001). Thus the three groups
differed significantly on HADS-A with the depression group showing highest anxiety levels,
then the other difficulties group and never depressed controls showing lowest anxiety levels.
These findings suggest that the depression group also experience high levels of co-morbid
anxiety, commonly found in clinical samples.
3.2.1 Hypotheses 2 and 3b
Results that relate to goal linking and rumination are critical to hypotheses 2 and 3b. In
hypothesis 2 it was hypothesised that people with clinical depression would demonstrate a
greater tendency to goal link and greater rumination than the comparison clinical group of
people with other psychological difficulties. Hypothesis 3b suggests that people with no
history of depression will experience less rumination and have a lower tendency to goal link
than the clinical groups. It was therefore predicted that scores on the measures of linking and
rumination will be highest in the depression group and lowest in the never depressed group.
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For rumination, post hoc comparisons revealed significant differences between all three
groups. Rumination (SRSQ) scores for the depression group were significantly higher than
for the other difficulties group (effect size d=1.69; mean diff 8.21, SE 1.42; p<0.001) and the
never depressed control group (effect size d=2.68; mean diff 12.02, SE 1.45; p<0.001).
Rumination scores for the other difficulties group were significantly lower than the depression
group (effect size d=1.69; mean diff -8.21, SE 1.42; p< 0.001) but significantly higher than
the never depressed control group (effect size d=0.75; mean diff 3.80, SE 1.41; p=0.026).
Thus, as predicted, the three groups differed significantly on rumination with the depressed
group showing highest rumination, the never depressed controls least rumination and the other
difficulties group falling in the middle. This result is interpreted as supporting hypothesis 2
and 3b. Figure 2 below illustrates the medians and distributions of rumination scores by
group in a box plot.
Figure 2
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For goal linking, post hoc comparisons found significant differences between some groups but
not all. Goal linking scores in the depression group were significantly higher than in the other
difficulties group (effect size d=0.71; mean diff 2.06, SE 0.83; p=0.047) and never depressed
control group (effect size d=0.97; mean diff 2.06, SE 0.83; p=0.005). While, logically, goal
linking scores in the other difficulties group were significantly lower than the depression
group (effect size d=0.71; mean diff-2.06, SE 0.83; p=0.047) there was no significant
difference on linking between the other difficulties and never depressed control groups (effect
size d=0.26; mean diff 0.71, SE 0.81; p=1.00). In other words, goal linking was significantly
higher in the depression group than both the other groups and, though the mean score for
linking was lowest in the never depressed controls, the difference between groups 2 and 3 was
non-significant. The results are consistent with hypothesis 2, that people with clinical
depression demonstrated a greater tendency to goal link than participants with other
difficulties. The finding that people with no history of clinical depression do not differ
significantly on linking to those with other difficulties does not support hypothesis 3b,
however the finding that those with no history of clinical depression demonstrated
significantly lower linking than those with depression is consistent with hypothesis 3b. Thus
overall the results are interpreted as providing partial support for hypothesis 3b. It is of note
that while the majority of differences explored above are large and reach significance, effect
sizes indicate that those for rumination are greater than goal linking. Figure 3 below
illustrates the medians and distributions of goal linking scores by group in a box plot.
3.2.2 Hypotheses 1 and 3a
Results that relate to daily hassles and life events are key to hypotheses 1 and 3a. Hypothesis
1 suggested that people with clinical depression would experience similar levels of daily
hassles and life events to a comparison group of people with psychological difficulties other
than depression. Hypothesis 3a suggested that people with no history of clinical depression
would experience fewer daily hassles and life events than the clinical groups. It was therefore
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predicted that scores on daily hassles and life events measures would be lowest in the never
depressed group.
Figure 3.





For total extent of daily hassles experienced in the preceding month, post hoc comparisons
show that, like linking, significant differences were detected between some groups but not all.
The total extent of daily hassles experienced in the depression group was significantly higher
than in both the other difficulties group (effect size d=1.09; mean diff 18.55, SE 4.62;
p<0.001) and the never depressed group (effect size d=1.54; mean diff 24.11, SE 4.71;
p<0.001). The mean hassles total for the other difficulties group was only slightly higher than
for the never depressed group and this difference was non-significant (effect size d=0.38;
mean diff 5.56, SE 4.57; p=0.683). The depression group thus experienced significantly
greater daily hassles than the other groups, while there was no significant difference in the
extent of hassles experienced by people with other difficulties and those with no history of
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depression. The findings offer partial support to hypothesis 3a in that those with no history of
depression report significantly lower levels of hassles than people with depression but the
result does not support hypothesis 3a in that the other difficulties and never depressed groups
showed no significant difference. Similarly, the findings do not support hypothesis 1, as
hassle levels between groups 1 and 2 were not similar, but significantly different. The main
outcome is that those with depression experienced significantly greater daily hassles. Figure 4
below illustrates the medians and distributions of daily hassles total scores by group in a box
plot.
Figure 4,
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As previously noted, the one way ANOVA found no significant group difference for total
number of life events experienced in the previous two years (F (2, 67) = 2.848; p=0.065).
Taken in isolation, the finding that there were no differences in the number of life events
experienced by people with major depression, other difficulties and those with no history of
depression would support hypothesis one but not hypothesis 3a. Significant differences
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between groups were detected however on life events scaled scores (F (2, 67) = 3.932;
p=0.024) and total impact of life events scores (F (2, 67) = 6.883; p=0.002).
Participants life events scaled score total represents the sum of the weighting value assigned to
each item on the original life change list and reflects an estimate of the readjustment each
event demands. Post hoc comparisons revealed a significant difference between life events
scaled scores in the depression group and never depressed control group such that life events
scaled scores were significantly higher (effect size d=0.82; mean diff 55.35, SE 20.81;
p=0.029). No other group differences reached significance. Figure 5 illustrates the medians
and distributions of life events scaled scores by group.
Figure 5.
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The same pattern of results was found for measures of the impact of life events. Post hoc




















with never depressed controls (effect size d=1.02; mean diff 7.74, SE 2.11; p=0.001). Again
no other group differences reached significance.
Collectively the results suggest that while people experiencing major depression experienced
a similar number of life events to the other groups, the degree of adjustment required (scaled
score) and the impact of life events were significantly greater for those with major depression
than those with no history of major depression. No significant difference was found on
number, impact or scaled scores between groups 1 and 2 or groups 2 and 3. The life events
results offer support for the suggestion in hypothesis 1 of similar levels of life events between
clinical groups. The findings offer partial support to hypothesis 3 a: people with no history of
clinical depression showed lower scaled scores and experienced less impact of the life events
experienced, this difference reaching significance. However the finding of no significant
difference between the other difficulties group and never depressed group on any of the life
events measures fails to support hypothesis 3a completely.
3.2.3 Summary ofprimary analysis
Thus far the primary analysis suggests:-
1.) The findings are interpreted to support hypothesis 2: that people with clinical depression
experience greater rumination and goal linking than people experiencing other psychological
difficulties. Significant group differences between the depressed and the other difficulties
group were found for both rumination and goal linking.
2.) The results are interpreted as providing partial support for hypothesis 3b: that people with
no history of clinical depression experience less rumination and a lower tendency to goal link
than clinical groups. In support, the control group were significantly lower on rumination than
both clinical groups. The significant group difference on goal linking between the never
depressed and depressed group was also consistent. However, no significant group difference
was found on goal linking between the never depressed and the other difficulties group.
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Thus it would be important to qualify hypothesis 3b, that no evidence was found that people
with no histoiy of depression experience less goal linking than people with other
psychological difficulties.
3.) Hypothesis 1, that people with clinical depression would experience similar levels of daily
hassles and life events to the comparison group of people with other psychological difficulties,
received mixed support. Significant differences on daily hassles between groups 1 and 2 do
not support the hypothesis. In support however, there were no significant differences on
number, impact or scaled score of life events between the clinical groups. Thus the
hypothesis is supported in relation to life events but not with respect to daily hassles.
4.) Hypothesis 3a, that people with no history of clinical depression will experience fewer
daily hassles and life events than the clinical groups again received mixed support.
Significant differences between the control group and depression group on daily hassles, life
events scaled scores and the impact of life events ar e consistent with the hypothesis, however
these differences were not found between the control group and other difficulties group. The
absence of any significant group difference on number of life events is also inconsistent.
Overall the results are interpreted to provide partial support, qualified in that people with no
history of clinical depression experience fewer daily hassles and lower elements of life events
(impact, events requiring less adjustment) than people with depression. However there was no
evidence of a different number of life events between the control group and the depression




The study's overall question concerns whether people with clinical depression respond to
daily hassles with rumination, as a function of their tendency to goal link? To help explore
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this question further, secondary analysis was performed on the data to unravel the relative
contributions of specific dependent variables on the group differences revealed in the primary
analysis and to provide suggestions about the direction of relationships.
A series of one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) were performed separately on the
rumination and goal linking variables, with group (depressed, other difficulties, never
depressed controls) as the independent variable. This analysis enabled exploration of the
impact of these key variables on group differences when the effect of another variable (goal
linking, rumination, daily hassles, life events or mood) was partialled out.
Firstly, it was found that group differences on rumination previously detected remained highly
significant, when the effects of goal linking are controlled for (F (2, 66) = 27.54; p<0.001).
Conversely, group differences on goal linking were reduced from highly significant (F (2, 67)
= 5.767; p=0.005) to non-significance when the effects of rumination were partialled out (F
(2, 66) = 1.31; p=0.276). The results show that while group differences in rumination remain
strongly significant despite controlling for linking, when the effect of group differences on
rumination is controlled, differences on goal linking no longer reach significance. This
suggests that rumination is more strongly related to group differences of depression than goal
linking.
Further ANCOVA comparisons revealed that group differences on rumination remain
significant after controlling separately for the following factors: daily hassles (F (2, 66) =
16.038; p<0.001); life events scaled score (F (2, 66) = 30.160; p<0.001); impact of life events
(F (2, 66) = 26.005, p<0.001); HADS-D (F (2, 66) = 5.148; p=0.008) and anxiety, HADS-A
(F (2, 66) = 7.079; p=0.002). Only when the CES-D mood measure was partialled out did
group differences on rumination become non-significant (F (2, 66) = 0.263; p< 0.770).
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The picture was somewhat different for goal linking. Group differences on goal linking also
remained significant after controlling separately for life events scaled score (F (2, 66) = 4.708;
p=0.012); impact of life events (F (2, 66) = 3.684; p=0.030) and anxiety, HADS-A (F (2, 66)
= 3.148; p=0.049). Group differences on goal linking were reduced to non-significance when
daily hassles (F (2, 66) = 2.498; p=0.090); HADS-D (F (2, 66) = 2.582; p=0.083) and CES-D
(F (2, 66) = 1.415; p=0.25) were controlled for, in addition to rumination. Collectively the
results suggest that rumination is a larger factor in group differences on major depression than
goal linking. In contrast to suggestions made by goal progress theory and findings by
Mcintosh & Martin (1992; 1995), these results are more consistent with the suggestion that
linking is a consequence of rumination rather than a cause. The finding that controlling for
mood, as measured by the CES-D, reduces group differences on rumination to non-
significance is suggestive of the interpretation that rumination is a response to depressed
mood. Though tentative, the results are more suggestive of rumination as a mediator between
depression and goal linking than as the mediator between goal linking and depression. In
relation to the main question, the results, from both primary and secondary analysis thus far,
suggest that while people with clinical depression do respond to daily hassles with rumination,
rumination does not appear to be a function of their tendency to goal link.
3.3.2 Question 4
This is a subsidiary question of the study: what is the relative impact of daily hassles and life
events on goal linking and rumination? To explore this question a number of Pearson r
correlations and partial correlations were performed on daily hassles, impact of life events,
goal linking and rumination data from the total sample.
Daily hassles and rumination were found to be positively and moderately related (r = +0.654,
n=70, p<0.001, 1 tailed). Impact of life events and rumination were also positively and
moderately related, though the strength of the relationship was lower (r=+0.427, n=70,
p<0.001, 1 tailed). In contrast daily hassles and goal linking were positively but weakly
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related (r = +0.315, n=70, p=0.004, 1 tailed). Impact of life events and goal linking were also
positively and weakly related (r= +0.268, n=70, p=0.012, 1 tailed), again the strength of the
relationship was slightly lower than with hassles and goal linking. The results suggest that
with both rumination and goal linking, relationships were a little stronger for daily hassles
than impact of life events. Further relationships of both hassles and life events were stronger
with rumination than with goal linking.
Partial correlations were used to further unpack the relative impact of daily hassles and impact
of life events. Though reduced, the correlation between hassles and rumination remained
highly significant even when the variance due to impact of life events was partialled out
(r=0.559, n=70, p<0.001, 1 tailed). In contrast, the correlation between impact of life events
and rumination reduced to non significance when daily hassles was controlled for (r=0.136,
n=70, p=0.133, 1 tailed). These findings suggest that a large part of the relationship between
life events and rumination is due to daily hassles and that daily hassles are more strongly
associated with rumination than impact of life events.
Similarly while reduced, the relationship between daily hassles and goal linking remained
significant when impact of life events was controlled for (i=0.214, n=70, p=0.039, 1 tailed).
A.gain however the relationship between impact of life events and goal linking was reduced to
non significance when daily hassles was partialled out (r=0.129, n=70, p=0.146, 1 tailed).
This suggests that a large part of the weak relationship between life events and goal linking is
due to daily hassles and that hassles are more strongly associated with goal linking than
impact of life events.
The ANOVA and ANCOVA results for goal linking and rumination, previously reported,
provide results consistent with the suggestion that daily hassles are more strongly associated
with these variables than impact of life events. Specifically, when ANCOVA controlled for
daily hassles, the F value for the significant group differences on rumination was reduced
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from F=35.78 to F=16.03. Though still significant this reduction is greater than when
ANCOVA controlled for impact of life events: here the F value for group differences of
rumination was less reduced (F=35.78 to F=26.01). Similarly, when ANCOVA controlled for
daily hassles, the F value for the significant group differences on goal linking was reduced
from F=5.77 to F=2.50 and was no longer significant (p=0.09). Again the reduction was
greater than when impact of life events was controlled (F=5.77 reduced to F=3.68, still
significant).
Partial correlations were performed to further explore the relative strength of relationships of
both hassles and impact of life events with rumination relative to goal linking. When goal
linking was controlled for; relationships remained significant between hassles and rumination
(r=+0.610, n=70, p<0.001, 1 tailed) and between impact of life events and rumination
(r=+0.368, n=70, p<0.001, 1 tailed). However when rumination was controlled for;
relationships between hassles and goal linking (r=+0.116, n=70, p=0.171, 1 tailed) and
between impact of life events and goal linking (r=+0.137, n=70, p=0.131, 1 tailed) were
reduced to non significance. The findings further support the suggestion that daily hassles and
impact of life events are more closely associated with rumination than goal linking.
To recap, in answer to question 4, the results suggest that both hassles and impact of life
events are more strongly associated with rumination than goal linking. Daily hassles are more
strongly associated with rumination than impact of life events. Hassles are also more strongly
associated with goal linking than impact of life events but within these relationships a lot of
the variance is due to rumination.
3.3.3 Linkers versus non-linkers
In previous studies of goal linking (e.g. Mcintosh et al 1995, 1997, 2001) analysis has
involved splitting participants into groups of linkers and non-linkers for comparison. Having
considered the study's main question and hypotheses, further post-hoc analysis comparing
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linkers and non-linkers was explored for interest - the rationale being that based on previous
work, this analysis may provide further insight into relationships between goal linking and the
other dependent variables. Thus, to explore the impact of goal linking further, the median
value of the Linking Inventory (7) was used to divide all participants into two groups for
analysis. Following Mcintosh and colleagues (1995, 1997), participants scoring 7-13 were
considered to report a linking style of response, while those scoring 0-6 were considered to
have a non-linking response. The sample was thus composed of 21 linkers and 49 non-
linkers.
A series of one way ANOVA with 2 levels of linking type, were performed across the
remaining main dependent variables: rumination, daily hassles, life events and mood.
Importantly, due to the unequal sample sizes, data met the assumptions of homogeneity of
variance and normal distribution. Significant differences were found between linkers and
non-linkers on: rumination (F (1, 68) = 8.194; p=0.006); daily hassles (F (1, 68) = 7.171;
p=0.009); CES-D (F (1, 68) = 8.130; p=0.006); HADS-A (F (1, 68) = 4.014; p=0.049) and
HADS-D (F (1, 68) = 5.995; p=0.017). In all cases linkers total scores were higher than non
linkers. No significant difference was found between linkers and non-linkers for any measure
of life events. The results suggest, consistent with Mcintosh et al (1992; 1995), that linkers
show significantly greater rumination, low mood, anxiety and experience hassles to a greater
extent than non-linkers.
A number of one-way ANCOVA were performed separately on the rumination, daily hassles,
and CES-D variables, with link type (linkers, non linkers) as the independent variable. In this
instance all significant differences between linkers and non linkers on rumination, daily
hassles or CES-D were reduced to non-significance when each of the other variables
(rumination, daily hassles or CES-D) was partialled out. Together these results suggest that
linkers did differ significantly from non-linkers on rumination, daily hassles, mood and
anxiety. The ANCOVAs suggest that any differences in the extent to which rumination,
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hassles and CES-D relate to linking are less clear or structured than the differences previously
detected in the extent to which rumination and linking relate to major depression.
A number of Pearson r correlations and partial correlations were examined again comparing
relationships between daily hassles and life events (impact, scaled score) among linkers and
non-linkers. Among linkers: moderate, positive correlations were found between daily
hassles and scaled score life events (r= +0.546, n=21, p=0.005, 1 tailed) and between daily
hassles and impact of life events (r = +0.681, n=21, p<0.001, 1 tailed). Among non-linkers:
weak, positive correlations were found between daily hassles and scaled score life events
(r=+0.358, n=49, p=0.006, 1 tailed) and between daily hassles and impact of life events
(r=+0.341, n=49, p=0.009, 1 tailed). Thus correlations between daily hassles and impact / size
of life events were stronger among linkers than non-linkers. The finding is consistent with a
stronger relationship between major life events and daily hassles in linkers as compared with
non-linkers.
Partial correlations for the above relationships were perfonned, controlling for rumination.
Among linkers: the relationships between daily hassles and scaled score life events (r=+0.515,
n=21, p=0.010, 1 tailed) and between daily hassles and impact of life events (r=+0.605, n=21,
p=0.003, 1 tailed) remained moderate and significant. Among non-linkers however,
relationships between daily hassles and scaled score life events (r=+0.193, n=49, p=0.095, 1
tailed) and between daily hassles and impact of life events (r=+0.127, n=49, p=0.195, 1 tailed)
were reduced to non significance. Thus a large part of the relationship between hassles and
life events in non-linkers is due to rumination, but this is not the case for linkers.
3.3.4 Summary ofSecondary Analysis
Further to the results from the primary analysis, secondary analysis suggests:-
1.) ANCOVA analysis demonstrated that rumination is more strongly related to major
depression group differences than goal linking. The findings are more consistent with the
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suggestion that linking is a consequence of rumination rather than a cause and that rumination
is a response to depressed mood. The results support the idea that people with clinical
depression respond to daily hassles with rumination, but not as a function of their tendency to
goal link.
2.) In answer to question 4, correlational analysis suggests that daily hassles and impact of
life events are both more strongly associated with rumination than goal linking. Hassles show
a stronger association with rumination than major life events. Hassles are also more strongly
associated with goal linking than major life events; however within these relationships a lot of
the variance is due to rumination.
3.) ANOVA analysis comparing linkers with non linkers, suggests that linkers showed
significantly higher rumination, daily hassles, low mood and anxiety than non-linkers.
ANCOVA comparisons suggest the extent to which rumination, hassles or CES-D relate to
linking is less clear or structured than the differences previously detected in the extent to
which rumination and linking relate to major depression. Correlations between daily hassles
and impact of life events are stronger among linkers than non linkers. Compared with linkers,
a larger part of the association between daily hassles and impact of life events, in non-linkers,
is due to rumination.
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Chapter 4. Discussion
An overview and discussion of the main findings will be followed by consideration of the
study's implications, limitations and strengths. Conclusions and recommendations for future
research will then be addressed.
4.1 Group Differences in Rumination, Goal Linking, Daily Hassles & Life Events
The main aim of this study was to explore whether people with clinical depression respond to
daily hassles with rumination as a function of their tendency to goal link. In order to begin to
answer this question, hypotheses 1-3 were explored to assess the extent to which people with
major depression, other psychological difficulties and those with no history of clinical
depression differed with respect to rumination, goal linking, daily hassles and life events as
well as mood and anxiety.
Large and significant differences were found between all three groups on both CES-D and
HADS measures ofmood. The mean CES-D score for people with major depression reflected
severe symptoms of depression, the mean score for those with other psychological difficulties
reflected mild, non-clinical symptoms and the mean score of those with no history of
depression fell within the lowest, not depressed, category. Thus the groups were found to be
distinct, with respect to mood, suggesting successful manipulation of the independent
variable, major depression.
The three groups also showed large significant differences on anxiety (HADS-A). Those with
major depression reported highest anxiety, the group mean falling within the severe anxiety
category. The other difficulties group fell between groups 1 and 3, group mean anxiety score
falling just within the mild, non-clinical, category. The never depressed group reported lowest
anxiety levels, group mean score falling within the normal range. The finding suggests those
with major depression were also experiencing high levels of co-inorbid anxiety. Co-morbid
85
anxiety is a common feature among clinical samples of people experiencing major depression
and will be discussed further when considering study limitations.
4.1.1 Rumination & Goal Linking
As predicted, large and significant group differences were found between all three groups on
rumination (effect sizes d=0.75-2.68). Thus those with major depression showed highest
rumination, the never depressed control participants least rumination and those with other
difficulties falling in the middle - ruminating significantly less than the depressed group and
significantly more than the never depressed controls. The finding of greater rumination
among those with major depression is consistent with goal progress theory (Martin & Tesser,
1989, 1996; Martin, Tesser & Mcintosh, 1993) and with research linking rumination to
deleterious outcomes such as a more severe depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). That those
with other psychological difficulties evidenced significantly greater rumination than never
depressed controls supports suggestions within the S-REF model and wider literature that
rumination is not exclusive to depression. However, greater rumination among those with
major depression, than found in either group 2 or 3, would indicate that rumination is a
particularly salient feature within depression, relative to other difficulties.
People with major depression showed significantly greater goal linking than those with other
psychological difficulties and never depressed participants. The difference between those
with major depression and never depressed participants was large (effect size d=0.97); the
difference between those with major depression and participants with other difficulties was
medium to large (effect size d=0.71). While the mean score for linking was lowest among the
control group, the difference between goal linking scores for participants with other
difficulties and the control group was not significant. Evidence of significantly higher goal
linking among the major depression group is consistent with the goal progress view of
associations between goal linking, negative affect and depression. Interestingly, the finding
that significant differences were only found between the major depression group and other
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groups suggests a particular association between goal linking and depression, as compared
with other psychological difficulties.
The study therefore found support for hypothesis 2, that people with clinical depression
demonstrated a greater tendency to ruminate and goal link than people with psychological
difficulties other than depression. Partial support was found for hypothesis 3b: a non-clinical
comparison group of people with no history of clinical depression reported experiencing
significantly less rumination than the clinical groups and a lower tendency to goal link than
those with major depression. No evidence of a significant difference on goal linking however
was found between the non-clinical group and people with other psychological difficulties.
Thus highest rumination and goal linking within a clinical population of people experiencing
major depression is consistent with goal progress theory and supportive of a role for goal
linking in depressive rumination.
4.1.2 Daily Hassles and Life Events
Participants with major depression reported a significantly greater experience of daily hassles
in the preceding month than both participants with other difficulties and those with no history
of depression. Differences between groups were large (effect sizes d=1.09 & 1.54
respectively). Groups 2 and 3 did not differ significantly on daily hassles. Again the finding
of a high level of daily hassles, combined with higher goal linking and rumination, among
those with clinical depression is consistent with goal progress theory. Mcintosh, Harlow and
Martin's (1995) found that undergraduate students who goal link and experience a high level
of daily hassles, subsequently reported greater depression than non-linkers and linkers
experiencing few hassles. Thus a high level of hassles and goal linking, as also found in this
study, might be expected among those experiencing major depression. These factors
combined with rumination are likely to increase people's vulnerability to continued negative
affect.
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Frequent daily hassles have previously been associated with depression (Jung & khalsa, 1989)
and wider difficulties including anxiety (Kohn & Gurevich, 1993), thus significant difference
on hassles between the clinical groups was not initially anticipated. Participants with major
depression may well have experienced more frequent daily hassles than those with other
psychological difficulties. Though speculative, it is also possible that difficulties inherent to
depression, biased thinking, impaired motivation and hopelessness, may cause people with
major depression to experience the same objective hassles as more intensely difficult and thus
to report hassles as occupying a greater part of their life than people experiencing other
psychological difficulties. The relevance of this distinction may be minimal however, given
the importance of the impact of people's perceptions of events on mood (Mcintosh & Martin,
1992). Thus if a difference in perception does exist, this reflects the reality of people's
experience.
Like Bergh et al (2005) there was no significant difference in the number of life events
experienced in the preceding two years by people with major depression, other difficulties and
those with no history of depression. However, those with major depression did report
significantly higher life events scaled score and impact of life events than never depressed
control participants. The size of these differences was large (effect size d=0.82 for scaled
score, effect size d=1.02 for impact). Thus while participants in each group experienced a
similar number of life events, people with major depression experienced more major life
events (e.g. death, marital separation), that are thought to demand a greater degree of
adjustment, than par ticipants with no history of depression. Logically, participants with major
depression also experienced significantly greater impact of the life events they experienced
than those with no history of depression. No other group differences on life events reached
significance.
Consistent with Brown et al's (1995) finding that negative life events associated with
depression involved loss, several of the larger negative life events on the social readjustment
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rating scale (short form, Holmes & Rahe, 1967) involve death, illness or separation from a
close relative. These events were experienced to a greater extent by those with major
depression lending further support the association between loss and depression.
Mcintosh, Martin & Jones (1997) found that people who goal link were more influenced by
reflecting on life events, when rating their happiness, than non-linkers. The authors suggest
that people who goal link may perceive life events as a greater threat to higher order goals
leading to greater rumination and depression. This study finds that those with major
depression experience greatest levels of rumination and goal linking and significantly greater
impact of more major life events compared with group 3. These group differences alone
however do not suggest how the variables might relate. Further, it is possible that people with
major depression and higher goal linking may perceive life events as greater threats to higher
order goals, but differences in mood may reflect the fact that those with major depression are
indeed dealing with larger life events.
Considering daily hassles and life events together, the study provides mixed support for
hypothesis 1. People with clinical depression did experience similar levels of life events but
significantly greater daily hassles to a comparison group of people with other psychological
difficulties. Thus the hypothesis is supported with respect to life events but not daily hassles.
Results provide mixed support for hypothesis 3a. It was found that a non-clinical group of
people with no history of depression experienced fewer daily hassles and less impact of fewer
major life events than people with clinical depression. However, people with no history of
depression showed no significant difference of hassles or any aspect of life events to people
experiencing other psychological difficulties. While not all the predicted group differences
were detected, the findings of highest rumination, goal linking and daily hassles among those
with major depression is consistent with goal progress theory and supportive of a role for goal
linking in depressive rumination. That people with clinical depression experienced
significantly more major life events, which had a greater impact on their life, than people with
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no history of clinical depression is suggestive of some role of major life events in clinical
depression.
4.2 Is Rumination a Function ofGoal Linking?
Work by Mcintosh, Martin et al (1992; 1995) with undergraduate students and goal progress
theory suggests that goal linking can lead people to ruminate, when lower order goals are
threatened, which is in turn associated with lower mood and depression. The model predicts
that rumination mediates the relationship between linking and negative affect.
The main question of this study was whether a sample of people experiencing clinical
depression would respond to daily hassles with rumination as a function of their tendency to
goal link. The relative contribution of different variables to the group differences previously
described was explored, to provide suggestions about the direction of relationships within a
clinical sample. Group differences in rumination remained highly significant when the effect
of goal linking was statistically controlled for. In contrast, differences between groups on
goal linking no longer reached significance when the effect of rumination was partialled out.
The findings suggest that rumination was more strongly related to group differences of
depression than goal linking.
The relative strength of the relationship between rumination and group, compared with goal
linking and group was further highlighted. Group differences in rumination remained
significant after separately controlling for daily hassles; life events impact and scaled scores;
HADS-D and anxiety. Only when the CES-D mood measure was partialled out did group
differences on rumination reduce to non-significance. Group differences in goal linking
remained significant after separately controlling for life events impact and scaled scores and
anxiety. Group differences in rumination became non-significant after controlling for daily
hassles and CES-D, in addition to rumination. Together the results suggest that rumination is
a larger factor in group differences ofmajor depression than goal linking.
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In contrast to the suggestions of goal progress theory and findings of Mcintosh, Martin et al
(1992; 1995), these findings are more consistent with the suggestion that goal linking is a
consequence of rumination rather than a cause. The finding that controlling for mood (CES-
D) reduced group differences on rumination to non-significance is suggestive of the
interpretation that rumination is a response to depressed mood. Thus, though tentative, the
results are more indicative of rumination as a mediator between depression and goal linking
than as the mediator between goal linking and depression. In response to the studies main
question, collectively the results indicate that while people with clinical depression do respond
to daily hassles with rumination, rumination does not appear to be a function of their tendency
to goal link.
It is important to highlight that suggestions made about the direction of relationships between
depression, rumination and goal linking are tentative. Suggestions previously made
Mcintosh, Martin et al (1992; 1995) that rumination mediates the relationship between goal
linking and negative affect are also based on analysis from a small number of studies. Again,
where studies are correlational, only tentative conclusions can be drawn about the direction of
relationships. Thus interpretations require a degree of caution. Nevertheless it is plausible
that a different pattern of findings emerge among participant experiencing clinical depression
compared with non-clinical student populations. The study's finding of significantly higher
goal linking, rumination and hassles among participants with major depression is suggestive
of a role for goal linking in depressive rumination, however goal linking appears secondary to
rumination in terms of variables that differentiate people with major depression, other
difficulties and non-clinical control participants.
The suggestion that rumination is not a function of goal linking highlights the need to consider
wider possible mechanisms between depression and rumination and additional reasons why
people ruminate. As previously discussed, wider research would suggest that rumination is
not only about goal linking and the pursuit of higher order goals. Rumination may reflect
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other metacognitive beliefs about the value of rumination to understand and resolve
depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a & b). Rumination may be pursued in an attempt to
reduce the discrepancy between a person's desired and actual state and an attempt, not always
to pursue a goal, but to process the unpleasant emotions associated with depression in order to
withdraw from an unattainable goal (Pyszc2ynski & Greenberg, 1987; Teasdale & Barnard,
1993). As certain goals may be very difficult for an individual to relinquish, positive
metacognitive beliefs can result in prolonged rumination and greater risk of prolonged or
exacerbated depression.
Goal progress theory may be somewhat limited as a model for understanding rumination in
clinical depression. In contrast to the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems Model (ICS: Teasdale
& Barnard, 1993) and the Self Regulatory Model of Depression (Pyszczynski & Greenberg,
1987), Goal Progress theory does not describe in detail the maladaptive cycle of self
regulation between actual and desired states, or depressive interlock, in which many people
with clinical depression appear to become stuck. This cycle tends not to result in goal
progress but to be more reflective of an attempt to process emotion and an inability to
withdraw from a goal. Further, in contrast to the above models and the S-REF model (Wells
& Matthews, 1994; 1996), goal progress theory does not detail aspects of rumination which
may be automatic and uncontrollable. Perhaps goal progress theory better reflects
relationships between goal linking, rumination and negative affect experienced within non¬
clinical populations, where shorter lived rumination, possibly including adaptive self
reflection, is more likely to ultimately serve a function and lead to goal progress. In contrast,
for people with clinical depression the demand for emotional processing is greater and causes
of rumination may multiply, as a result the relative strength of goal linking compared with
rumination may be less than among non-clinical samples.
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4.3 What is the relative impact of daily hassles and life events?
Correlational analysis, from the sample as a whole, revealed moderate positive correlations
between daily hassles and rumination and between impact of life events and rumination. Both
daily hassles and impact of life events showed positive and weak associations with goal
linking.
Partial correlations demonstrated that the relationship between hassles and rumination
remained significant when the effect of impact of life events was controlled; however the
relationship between impact of life events and rumination reduced to non-significance when
daily hassles were controlled. Daily hassles were therefore found to be more strongly related
to rumination than impact of life events. Fuxther, a large part of the relationship between
impact of life events and rumination was due to daily hassles. The same pattern of findings
emerged for goal linking. Thus daily hassles were more strongly associated with goal linking
than impact of life events. Again, a large part of the relationship between impact of life
events and goal linking was due to daily hassles. This pattern of findings was confirmed by
greater reductions in the F value for rumination and goal linking group differences when daily
hassles was controlled by ANCOVA, relative to impact of life events.
The finding that daily hassles were more strongly related to rumination and goal linking, than
impact of life events, is consistent with previous and somewhat surprising findings which
suggest that daily hassles are perhaps more closely related to well being than life events
(Kanner et ah, 1981; Russell & Davey, 1993). It has previously been suggested that the
impact of more major life events on well being may be mediated through daily hassles, for
example due to disrupted activities and relationships following major life events. The
findings that a large part of the relationships between impact of life events and both
rumination and goal linking are due to hassles, would offer some support to this suggestion.
Other studies, however, suggest both hassles and life events impact on well being
independently (Chamberlain & Zikka, 1990). What ever the mechanism, the findings
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highlight the relative significance of daily hassles on factors associated with depressed mood.
The finding confirms the importance in clinical work of supporting people with depression to
develop strategies, such as problem solving, that alleviate the impact of daily hassles as well
as adjusting to more major life events.
In addition to the associations described above, it was found that relationships between daily
hassles and rumination and between impact of life events and rumination remained significant
when the effect of goal linking was controlled. When the effect of rumination was partialled
out however, correlations between daily hassles and goal linking and between impact of life
events and goal linking reduced to non-significance. This outcome and differences in the
strength of initial correlations suggest that both daily hassles and impact of life events are
more closely associated with rumination than goal linking. The finding that daily hassles and
life events, previously associated with the onset of depression, are more closely associated
with rumination than goal linking, emphasises the relative strength of connection between
rumination and major depression, relative to goal linking. Collectively the results are
consistent with the interpretation that daily hassles are associated with increased vulnerability
to depression in a context of rumination and goal linking, but more so in the context of
rumination.
4.4 Comparing Linkers and Non-Linkers
For interest and following Mcintosh and colleagues (1992; 1995; 1997), participants were
divided into linkers and non-linkers based on their scores on the linking inventoiy. Linkers
were found to report significantly higher scores for rumination, daily hassles, low mood
(CES-D & HADS-D) and anxiety. There were no significant differences between linkers and
non-linkers in life events. Significantly greater rumination, hassles and low mood in linkers is
consistent with the findings ofMcintosh et al (1992; 1995). The results are supportive of goal
progress theory that linkers are more likely than non-linkers to ruminate and experience low
mood in the presence of a high level of daily hassles. The findings suggest evidence of a role
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of goal linking in rumination and depression, but as before do not suggest how the variables
might relate.
One way ANCOVA were perfonned separately on the impact of rumination, daily hassles and
CES-D on group (linkers versus non linkers), when a third variable (rumination, hassles or
CES-D) was partialled out. This analysis was pursued in an attempt to explore the relative
impact of each variable on linking to enable consideration of suggestions about the direction
of relationships. Unlike before, all the significant differences between linkers and non-linkers
on rumination, daily hassles and CES-D were reduced to non-significance when each of the
other variables (CES-D, hassles or rumination) was controlled. It was therefore difficult to
draw conclusions about the direction of relationships beyond the suggestion that: any
differences in the extent to which mmination, hassles and CES-D relate to linking are less
clear or structured than the differences previously detected in the extent to which rumination
and linking relate to major depression.
Linkers showed moderate, positive correlations between daily hassles and life events (scaled
score and impact), while non-linkers showed weak positive correlations. The stronger
relationship between daily hassles and life events in linkers is supportive of the suggestion in
goal linking theory that linkers experience daily hassles as more threatening. For example
two people may experience a moderate level of life events. Person one, who goal links, may
experience the inevitable hassles associated with the life events as more of a threat to higher
order goals and thus report their experience ofgreater hassles. Person two, who does not goal
link, may be less sensitive to hassles associated with the life events and though a degree of
hassle is reported, the extent to which it is experienced as part of life is less. The finding
provides further support of the negative impact of goal linking.
To summarise the main findings of the study: a clinical population of people experiencing
major depression reported greater rumination, goal linking and daily hassles than people
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experiencing other psychological difficulties and a non-clinical group of people with no
history of depression. People with clinical depression also experienced more major life events
that have a greater impact than those with no histoiy of depression. The pattern of results is
consistent with goal progress theory and supports a role for goal linking in depressive
rumination.
Rumination, however, was found to be more strongly related to group differences in major
depression than goal linking. In contrast to findings of Mcintosh, Martin et al (1992; 1995),
these findings tentatively suggest that goal linking is a consequence of rumination rather than
a cause, that rumination is a response to depressed mood and that rumination appears to
mediate between depression and goal linking. Thus while people with clinical depression do
respond to daily hassles with rumination, rumination does not appear to be a function of their
tendency to goal link.
Daily hassles were more strongly associated with rumination and goal linking than impact of
life events. Both hassles and life events were more associated with rumination than goal
linking. Daily hassles are therefore significant to factors associated with clinical depression.
Greater rumination, daily hassles, low mood and anxiety in linkers, compared with non-
linkers, again supports goal progress theory and a role for goal linking in depressive
rumination. Any differences in the extent to which rumination, hassles and mood relate to
linking are less clear or structured than differences detected in the extent to which rumination
and linking relate to depression.
4.5 Theoretical & Clinical Implications
The findings of this study suggest that while elements ofgoal progress theory are helpful for a
clinical population, for example the prediction of higher levels of goal linking associated with
greater depression and rumination, the model may also be limited. Specifically, the model
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appears limited in explaining the breadth of factors that may be involved in dysfunctional
elements of rumination, which appear to dominate in clinical depression. A fuller
understanding of depressive rumination would therefore require integration of concepts
explored across a range ofmodels.
As detailed in section 4.2, if depressive rumination is not a function of the tendency to goal
link, then it is unlikely that rumination in depression predominantly involves goal linking and
the pursuit of higher order goals. The wider literature would suggest that depression and
rumination are also perpetuated by the wider, though largely erroneous, metacognitive beliefs
people may hold about the benefit of rumination to resolve depression (Papageorgiou &
Wells, 2001a & b). Other important theoretical constructs include cycles of self regulation
between actual and desired states, or depressive interlock, in which people presenting with
depression often seem to get stuck (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Teasdale & Barnard,
1993). It would also seem necessary to highlight aspects of rumination which may be
automatic and uncontrollable (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993;
Welts & Matthews, 1994; 1996). Thus while goal progress theory is helpful in understanding
relationships between goal linking, rumination and negative affect in non-clinical samples, for
people with clinical depression it may be somewhat limited. Rumination at the level of
depression ceases to be mainly about progressing with goals, but about attempts to regulate
strong emotions and great difficulty in withdrawing from unattainable goals.
The significantly greater rumination detected in participants with major depression compared
to those in other groups, and the relative strength of rumination, compared to goal linking,
with respect to group differences, both underline the importance of treatment approaches to
address rumination and relieve depression. Given that no one approach or model is dominant
in terms of efficacy (Robinson et al., 1990), it may be valuable to draw on a range of
treatments, perhaps more or less accessible to the client at difference stages of therapy.
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Thus initial approaches to break self-regulatory / depressive interlock cycles might include
behavioural components of CBT (Beck et al., 1979) such as distraction, problem solving and
engaging in pleasant events. The relationship of daily hassles to rumination, highlighted in
this study, emphasises the need for approaches that address everyday problems. Cognitive
strategies would involve identifying the dominant negative thoughts within the rumination
process and considering rational alternatives. This process involves distancing from
distressing cognitions and encourages people to step back from the process of rumination
while they consider alternative interpretations, thus breaking cycles of ruminative thought.
Following suggestions from the S-REF model, cognitive strategies targeting patients' positive
metacognitive beliefs about rumination, beliefs that maintain analytic rumination as a viable
coping strategy, could be addressed (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a & b). Further, negative
metacognitive beliefs (rumination will make me lose my mind) that further exacerbate mood
could be targeted.
Once the individual is less immersed in self-regulatory cycles, other approaches such as
mindfulness based cognitive therapy (MBCT Segal et al., 2002), where ruminative thoughts
and emotional states are observed in a non-judgemental manner may provide relief and reduce
relapse (Teasdale et al., 2000). Such approaches may promote adaptive self reflection
(Teasdale, 1999; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004) previously found to facilitate many of the
processes undermined in analytic ruminative self focus (e.g. social problem solving).
Whatever the direction of relationship between rumination and goal linking, goal linking is
clearly a feature ofmajor depression which would seem important to address clinically, even
if as a secondary aim to work targeting rumination. Approaches might include identifying
goal linking as a fonn of metacognition which may perpetuate low mood; encouraging
individuals to disconnect achievement or failure of lower order goals from achievement or
failure of higher goals, exploration of the meaning the individual attaches to goal frustrations;
and problem solving.
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4.6 Limitations & strengths
The study could be criticised for recruiting relatively impure clinical samples. Those with
major depression were found to also experience high levels of co-morbid anxiety,
significantly greater than anxiety in the other difficulties or control group. Thus arguably it
may be inaccurate to attribute the cause of results to depression and not to other factors, for
example anxiety. The SCID-IV interview was used to confirm the presence or absence of
major depressive disorder, therefore participants in group one were currently experiencing
major depression and those in group two were not and those in group three had no history of
depression. However wider exclusion criteria (e.g. formal diagnosis of personality disorder)
were assessed using information provided in the participant's referral letter rather than being
screened during interview. Although unlikely, it is possible that for participants in both
clinical groups wider exclusion criteria may have on occasion been missed.
In relation to screening, attempts were made in designing the study to limit the time demands
involved and to focus data collection on measures central to the study's questions.
Importantly the groups were distinct on measures of mood, such that those with major
depression experienced significantly greater low mood (severe low mood) than participants
with other difficulties (mild low mood) and never depressed controls (not depressed / normal
mood). Further all participants in the major depression group met SCID criteria which
include exclusion of difficulties better explained by bereavement, substance use or a medical
condition. Even if anxiety contributes to the results, it would seem unlikely that results did
not reflect such large group differences in mood. Consistently group differences on
rumination and goal linking remained significant when anxiety was controlled. Further in
clinical populations it is commonplace for people to present with depression and co-morbid
anxiety. Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) has found that rumination is particularly related and
therefore relevant to a mixed anxiety and depression syndrome. Thus an advantage of
studying a less pure but clinically representative sample is that generalisation to everyday
clinical populations is easier.
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Like many studies the samples are self selected. Though speculative, it is possible that
potential clinical participants who declined to participate in the research may demonstrate
different levels of goal linking relative to rumination and mood. Results may therefore not
reflect the nature of relationships between goal linking and rumination in depressed adults as a
whole.
The method of data collection relied entirely on participants' self report and therefore captures
their subjective reported experience of rumination, linking, mood, life events and hassles. To
some extent the accuracy of people's reporting is unknown. Nevertheless there is validity in
the individual's account of their experience. Results should therefore be interpreted to reflect
subjective self-report and considered in the context of other studies which arguably employ a
more objective experimental paradigm such as reaction time tasks (for example Koole et al.,
1999; Mcintosh & Martin, 1992) or follow up long term outcome (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema,
2000).
The measures of goal linking and rumination assess global tendencies to goal link and
ruminate respectively. While such measures have frequently been used in studies of goal
progress, items on the rumination scale do not directly reflect the extent to which rumination
might concern the specific unattained goals detailed in the linking inventory. It is possible
that the global nature of the measures may have masked relationships between goal linking
and rumination. Mcintosh and Martin 1992 overcame this limitation by assessing rumination,
via a reaction time task, in response to one particular goal (being in a romantic relationship).
Participants' degree of rumination about this specific goal was gauged by how quickly they
identified relationship related words. However, among clinically depressed participants, as
against undergraduate students, it might be somewhat challenging to detect a goal important to
the majority which some have and others do not.
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One of the main strengths of the study is exploration of goal linking, rumination and mood
within clinical samples. Previous studies of goal linking have predominantly recruited
undergraduate students. Recruitment of clinical samples enables consideration of the extent to
which relationships between goal linking and rumination, discussed in goal progress theory,
may translate to people's experience of clinical depression. In designing the study a power
calculation was performed to estimate the required sample size. The sample size necessary to
detect a large effect size, using analysis of variance, where power is 0.8 and significance level
p=0.05, was 22 participants in each condition. 70 participants took part, ensuring sufficient
statistical power and strengthening the study.
4.7 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
Despite the above limitations of this study the following conclusions can be made. A clinical
population of people with major depression experienced greater rumination, goal linking and
daily hassles than people with other psychological difficulties and people with no history of
major depression. Compared to those with no history of depression, people with major
depression also experienced more major life events that had a greater impact on their lives.
The pattern of findings is consistent with goal progress theory and suggests a role for goal
linking in depressive rumination. Clinically, as part of treatment for depression, it would
seem valuable to address metacognitive beliefs including beliefs about goals, to disconnect
associations between failures or achievement of lower order goals with failure or achievement
of higher order goals, which may help reduce vulnerability to low mood being maintained.
Rumination was found to be more strongly related to group differences in major depression
than goal linking. In contrast to Mcintosh, Martin et al (1992; 1995), findings tentatively
suggest that goal linking is a consequence of rumination rather than a cause; rumination is a
response to depressed mood and rumination appears to mediate between depression and goal
linking rather than between goal linking and depression. Thus while people with clinical
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depression do respond to daily hassles with rumination, rumination does not appear to be a
function of their tendency to goal link.
Theoretically, these findings highlight some limits of goal progress theory in detailing the
dysfunctional quality of depressive rumination. A fuller understanding of rumination in
depression may require integration of concepts from wider models including metacognitive
beliefs about the value of rumination, cycles of self-regulation between actual and desire
states and an automatic, uncontrollable quality to aspects of rumination. Findings also
underline the importance of targeting rumination in the treatment of depression. Associations
between daily hassles, rumination and goal linking, indicate that support to manage daily
problems, for example through problem solving, would be valuable, in addition to other
cognitive-behavioural approaches and therapies to enhance adaptive self focus.
Greater rumination, hassles, low mood and anxiety in people who goal link, compared to
people who do not, is also suggestive of a role for goal linking in depressive rumination. Any
difference in the extent to which rumination, hassles and mood related to linking were less
clear or structured than the differences in the extent to which rumination and linking related to
depression.
Further research that may help to progress the findings of this study could include a
replication study. Given that most studies of goal linking and rumination have recruited non¬
clinical participants, it would be valuable to detennine if a similar pattern of findings emerged
again with clinical populations, to confirm or refute the suggestions made above. It may be
helpful to further explore the direction of relationships between depression, rumination and
daily hassles among equal samples of participants who goal link relative to those who do not,
while also comparing clinical with non-clinical populations.
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To overcome the limitation of reliance on participant self report, relationships between goal
linking and rumination in clinical samples could follow previous studies (e.g. Mcintosh &
Martin, 1992) that assess rumination using an experimental task such as a reaction time
paradigm. It would be necessary for future work to assess the efficacy of clinical
interventions targeting metacognitive beliefs, including goal linking, to evaluate therapeutic
gain. Future research that integrates what is known about rumination, from the current range
ofmodels and studies would be valuable in increasing understanding of depressive rumination
and finding ways to relieve the distress experienced by people with major depression.
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Management Approval for Non-Commercial Research
I am pleased to tell you that you now have Management Approval for the research project
entitled 'Goal beliefs, daily hassles & rumination in depression'. I acknowledge that:
• The project is sponsored and funded by the University of Edinburgh.
• Ethics approval for the project has been obtained from the Highland Research Ethics
Committee (reference number 06/S0901/1).
NHS
Highland
Please direct all enquiries regarding this letter to the NHS Highland Research Manager (Dr
Catherine Sinclair 01463 667317).
Yours sincerely,
DR KEN PROCTOR
ASSOCIATE MEDICAL DIRECTOR (PRIMARY CARE)
cc Dr Catherine Sinclair, Unit 18, The Green House, Beechwood Business Park, Inverness
IV2 3BL
Working with you to make Highland the healthy place to he
Chairman: Garry Coutts
Chief Executive: Dr Roger Gibbins BA MBA PhD
NHS Highland, Assynt House, Beechwood Park, INVERNESS IV2 3HG
Highland NHS Board is the common name of Highland Health Board
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Inverness IV3 8NP Highland
Telephone 01463 704683
Fax 01463 704686
Date: 2006 Enquiries to: Secretary
Your Ref Direct Line: 704683
Our Ref: EM/TP Ema,1:
CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Sir / Madam,
My name is Emily Mcintosh, I am a trainee Clinical Psychologist and I am writing to you
to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you make a decision about taking
part it is important that you understand what will be involved and why the research is
being done. I have sent you a "participant information sheet" that explains what the study
is about, why you have been invited and what would be involved if you were willing to
take part. Please read the information sheet carefully and feel free to contact us if there is
anything you are unsure about or would like to ask any questions. All contact details are
provided at the end of the information sheet.
If you decide that you are willing to take part in the study:-
1. Please telephone Emily Mcintosh on 01463 704 683 to let me know that you are
willing to take part. A message can also be left at this number. If you leave a message
please could you leave your contact telephone number so that I can get back to you.
2. If you prefer, you can return the contact sheet attached in the stamped addressed
envelope provided.
3. Please also read the consent form. Please do not sign the consent form until you meet
with the researcher. Please bring the consent form with you to this meeting.
What will happen next is that I will telephone (or write if you prefer) to arrange a
convenient time to meet with you, either at home or at the psychology department for us
to carry out the study.
Working with you to make Highland the healthy place to be
iW*
Chairman: [To be appointedj
ChiefExecutive: Dr Roger Gibbins BA MBA PhD
NHS Highland, Assynt House, Beechwood Park, INVERNESS
IV2 3HG
HighlandNHSBoard is the common name ofHighland
Health Board
If you decide that you do not wish to take part:-
1. It would be very helpful if you could indicate that you do not wish to take part on the
contact sheet below and return this to me in the stamped addressed envelope. You are not
obliged to take any further action.
Thank you very much for your participation, I look forward to hearing from you.
Yours Sincerely
Emily Mcintosh Dr Sheelagh Rodgers







(Ifyou would rather not be contacted by telephone, leave this space blank and you will be contacted by post instead)
(please tick)
1.1 have read the infonnation leaflet and am willing to take part in the study.
I have read the consent form (please bring to meeting for signing with researcher).
2.1 do not wish to take part in the study
3.1 am considering participating but would like to speak to the researcher to







Study Title: Goal beliefs, daily hassles and rumination in depression
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. This research has ethical
approval from an NHS Research Ethics committee and also approval from Highland
Research and Development Office.
Before you make a decision about taking part it is important that you understand what
will be involved and why the research is being done.
Please read the following information carefully and feel free to contact us if there is
anything you are unsure about. All contact details are provided at the end of this
information sheet. Please take your time to decide whether you would like to take part
in this project.
What is this study about? Why is it important?
Research done in the past suggests that one reason why people find it hard to break out
of depressed moods is that they experience very repetitive negative thoughts and
feelings. This particularly happens after stressful events or day to day hassles. This
pattern of repetitive negative thoughts and feelings is known as rumination.
Further research carried out by psychologists looks at the way people think about their
goals, particularly how much people believe their happiness depends on reaching
certain day to day goals.
The aim of this study is to find out more about how beliefs about goals, and rumination
(repetitive negative thoughts) might be linked in affecting people's mood and
depression.
The hope is that better understanding of beliefs and thinking in depression will lead to
better and faster psychological treatments for people with depression in the future.
Who is carrying out the study?
The study is being carried out by Emily Mcintosh, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, as
part of her doctoral qualification in Clinical Psychology from Edinburgh University.
She will be supervised by Dr Sheelagh Rogers and Dr David Gillanders, both
Chartered Clinical Psychologists. The researcher has experience of interviewing and
working with people who experience depression.
Why have I been chosen?
You have been invited to attend for one of three main reasons:-
1. You have been referred to Clinical Psychology Services and your main difficulty is
depression. Or>
2. You have been referred to Clinical Psychology Services and your main difficulty is
not depression. Or:-
3. You have not been referred to Clinical Psychology Services.
A large number of people in a similar situation to you will also be invited to take part
in this study.
Do I have to take part?
It is completely up to you to decide whether you wish to take part. Your participation
is voluntary. You are also free to change your mind at any time and do not have to
give a reason for changing your mind.
Whether you decide to take part or not, any treatment you may be going to receive at
the Clinical Psychology Services will not be affected in any way.
What will be involved if I agree to take part?
If you decide to take part you will be asked to read the enclosed consent form, please
do not sign the form until you meet with the researcher. You will be contacted, either
by telephone or post, and offered an appointment at a time and place (psychology
department / home) that suits you. Please bring the consent form with you for signing.
The total time for the study is expected to be between 45 minutes to one hour.
At the appointment:-
You will be asked to sign the consent form. You will be asked brief details of
information such as your age, gender. You will be asked a series of questions about
your mood and other features of depression that you may or may not have experienced.
You will then be asked to complete a series of questionnaires with the researcher. The
questionnaires ask about happiness and goals, thinking patterns, what day to day
hassles you may have experienced recently from a given list, bigger life events you
may have had from a given list and mood. There are no right or wrong answers.
What if something goes wrong?
Answering the questions and filling out the questionnaires will involve thinking about
your current or past mood and noting from a list which, if any, hassles or life events
you have experienced. This process should not be distressing and you will not be
asked to talk in detail about yourself. The questions you will be asked are ones that
have often been used in previous research projects and in therapy and there have been
no reports of people becoming distressed. If you do find the questions/questionnaires
distressing the researcher will be present to offer support. If you continued to
experience distress after the meeting please do not hesitate to contact one of the people
listed at the end of this information sheet. Should this happen you will be offered
support by an appropriate professional should you wish it.
You are of course free to withdraw from the study at any point. If this were to happen
support would still be offered to you.
If you are unhappy about how the research has been carried out you can make a
complaint by following the normal NHS complaints procedure.
Will my information be kept confidential?
Yes. All the information about you and the questionnaires you fill out will be kept
strictly confidential. The questionnaires will be kept within the Clinical Psychology
Department in a locked, secure cabinet and destroyed after 5 years. This is in line with
the requirements of the data protection act.
The only time the researcher would contact anyone about what was discussed during
the appointment is if you were to tell the researcher that you were planning to harm
yourself or someone else. If this occurred the researcher would contact your GP.
What will happen to the results of the research study?
The research will be written up as part of Emily Mcintosh's doctorate in Clinical
Psychology from Edinburgh University. A summary of the study results will also be
sent to you if you would like a copy. In the future the results will be prepared for
scientific publication to benefit psychologists and people with depression
internationally.
Who do I contact for further information?
If you have any questions or need any further information about the study, please
contact any of the individuals below: -
Ms Emily Mcintosh
Trainee Clinical Psychologist





Tel: 01463 704 683 (ext:3694)
Dr David Gillanders
Chartered Clinical Psychologist &
Lecturer in Clinical Psychology
University ofEdinburgh





Tel: 0131 651 3946
If you would like any further information on this project from an independent advisor,









Tel: 01463 704 683 (ext:4682)



















Study: Goal beliefs, daily hassles and rumination in depression




(Ifyou would rather not be contacted by telephone, lea\>e the space blank and you can be contacted by post
instead)
1.1 confirm that I have read and understood the Information Sheet for the above study.
2. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have had these answered to my
satisfaction.
3. I understand that my taking part in this study is voluntary, that I am free to withdraw at
any time without having to give a reason and without my care being affected.
4. I agree to take part in this study.
Participant's Name (print) Date
Participant's Signature
Researcher's Signature Date
Working with you to make Highland the healthy place to be
NHS Highland, Assynt House, Beechwood Park, INVERNESS
IV2 3HG
HighlandNHS Board is the common name ofHighland
Health Board
Chairman: [To be appointed]

















Consent Form For Recording SCID Interview
I give consent for my interview with Ms Emily Mcintosh to be audio-recorded for the
purposes of research supervision. I understand that no one other than Emily Mcintosh and
her supervisor, Dr David Gillanders, will have access to the recording and that the tape
will be erased after it has been listened to. I understand that the recording will only be
used in supervision and for no other purpose. It has been explained that the recording
being made is confidential.
Signature:
Date:
Working with you to make Highland the healthy place to be
Chairman: [To be appointed]
Chief Executive: Dr Roger Gibbins BA MBA PhD
NHS Highland, Assynt House, Beechwood Park, INVERNESS
1V2 3HG
Highland NHS Board is the common name ofHighland
Health Board
APPENDIX 5
Mood disorders subsection of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-







Major Depressive Episode Criteria
INTRODUCTION: I am going to ask you some questions about your mood
Following Teasdale & Cox (2001) Screening Question (group 3):
Has there ever been a time that lasted at least a week when you felt extremely depressed or sad, that you
didn't care anymore or didn't enjoy anything? Yes / no
Section A (Five or more of the following symptoms have been present during the same 2 week period and
represent a change from previous functioning;; at least one of the symptoms is either (1) depressed
mood, or (2) loss of interest or pleasure.)
Ratings: ? = inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = present
Q A1 In the past month...
...has there been a period of time when you were feeling depressed or down most
of
the day, nearly every day? (What was that like?)
If yes: How long did it last? (as long as 2 weeks?)
If no: Has there ever been a period of time...(as above)
(If at least one past depressed period: have you had more than one time like that? Which one was the worst?)
? - +
Q A2 (In the past month)...what about losing interest or pleasure in things you
usually enjoyed?
If yes: Was it nearly every day? How long did it last? (As long as 2 weeks?)
If no: Has there ever been a time when you have lost interest...(as above)
(If at least one past period: have you had more than one time like that? Which one was the worst?)
? - +
If neither A1 nor A2 has ever been + the participant does not meet criteria
For the following questions, focus on the worst 2-week period:
Q A3 During (2 week period) ...did you lose or gain any weight? (how much? Were you
Trying to lose weight?)
? - +
If no: How was your appetite? (what about compared with your usual appetite?
Did you have to force yourself to eat? Eat (less/more) than usual? Was that nearly
Everyday?)
Q A4 ....how were you sleeping? (Trouble falling asleep, waking frequently, trouble staying
asleep, waking too early OR sleeping too much? How many hours a night compared
with usual? Was that nearly every night?)
? - +
Q A5 ..were you so fidgety or restless that you were unable to sit still? (Was it so bad
that other people noticed it? What did they notice? Was that nearly every day?)
If no: What about the opposite - talking or moving slowly than is normal for you?
(Was it so bad that other people noticed it? What did they notice? Was that nearly every
day?)
(nb: also consider behaviour during interview)
? - +
Q A6 ...What was your energy like? (Tired all the time? Nearly every day?) ? - +
Q A7 ...how did you feel about yourself? (Worthless? Nearly every day?)
If no: What about feeling guilty about things you had done or not done?
(Nearly everyday?)
? - +
Q A8 ...did you have trouble thinking or concentrating? (What kinds of things did it
interfere
with? Nearly every day?)
If No: Was it hard to make decisions about everyday things?
? - +
Q A9 ...were things so bad that you were thinking a lot about death or that you would
be better off dead? What about thinking of hurting yourself?




(scoring) At least 5 of A1-A9 are "+" and at least one of these is A(1) or A(2)
If A10 is (i.e. fewer than 5 are "+") ask the following if unknown:
(Have there been any other times when you've been depressed and had even
more Symptoms than we've just talked about?)
If "yes" go back to A1, and ask about that episode





(if unclear) C. Has (the depression/own words) made it hard for you to do your
work, take care of things at home, or get along with other people?
If A11 is (i.e. symptoms not clinically significant), ask the following if unknown:
(Have there been anv other times when vou've been depressed and it had more of
an effect on your life?)
If "yes" go back to A1, and ask about that episode




Just before this began, were you physically ill? (yes= )
Just before this began, were you taking any medications?
If yes: Any change in the amount you were taking?
Just before this began, were you drinking or using any street drugs?
If there is any indication that the depression may be secondary, assess, then rate -or +
IfA12 is (i.e. mood is due to substance misuse or general medical condition) ask:
Have there been other times when you've been depressed and it was not because
of (General medical condition / substance misuse)?
If "yes" go back to A1, and ask about that episode




(if unknown): Did this begin soon after someone close to you died? (yes= -)
If A13 is (i.e. the depressed mood is better accounted for by bereavement) ask:
Have there been other times when you've been depressed and it was not because
of the loss of a loved one?
If "yes" go back to A1, and ask about that episode
If "no" the participant does not meet the criteria.
? - +
QAM (Criteria A, C, D, and E are +)
Have you had (symptoms rated + above) in the past month?





QA15 How many separate times have you been (depressed/own words) nearly every day
For at least 2 weeks and had several of the symptoms that you just described,
such as (symptoms of worst episode)?
Total number of major depressive episodes
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INSTRUCTIONS: (I am going to read out a list of statements. After each statement I will read out two
possible responses.) Which of the two possible reactions more closely describes how you feel about the
preceding statement?
(Tick A or B)
1. You've won £10,000 in a contest.
A Now that I can afford many of the things I've always wanted, I will be much happier.
B I'm glad that I won the money, although I don't think it will influence how happy I am overall.
2. Does your weight influence your happiness?
A I am only happy when I am at my ideal weight
B It would be nice to be at my ideal weight, but I would be just as happy if I were not.
3. Do you get more happiness out of pursuing your goals or as a result of reaching them?
A I get more happiness out of striving for my goals; reaching them is just the icing on the cake.
B My happiness comes primarily from reaching my goals.
4. How critical for your happiness is it for you to be in a romantic relationship?
A It is difficult for me to be truly happy if I do not have someone in my life.
B I prefer to have someone in my life, but I can be just as happy without a partner.
5. Imagine that over the next 6 months the following things happen: You enter a competition
and win a new car, then a project you are working on at work goes badly, then you
go on a great holiday, then someone steals your car.
A My happiness will swing up and down as events in my life change.
B These are just natural events in my life, and they won't necessarily influence my happiness.
6. One day you realize you have all the things you want - the job you want, the spouse/
partner you want, the free time you want.
A This will not directly influence how happy I am, because happiness is something I determine,
regardless of what happens outwardly.
B_ If I have all the things I want then I will be completely happy.
7. How important is having money to your happiness?
A Being able to buy things I want when I want them definitely makes me happier.
B Once I have enough money for the basic necessities of life (like food, clothing and shelter),
more money will not make me happier.
8. Someone at your work is one of the most annoying, unpleasant people you've
ever known. (Tick a or B)
A I'm probably going to be unhappy whenever I'm around my workmate.
B I can be happy when I'm around my workmate if I really want to be.
9. How does good and bad luck affect your happiness?
A How I respond to good and bad luck in my life is more important than the good and bad events
themselves.
B The best way for me to keep from being unhappy is to keep bad things from happening to me.
The best way for me to be happier is to make good things happen to me.
10. What would it take for you to be happy right now?
A There are certain things that must happen in my life for me to be truly happy.
B The only thing that is keeping me from being happy right now is myself.
11. You just lost the job which you've had for five years and enjoyed very much.
A I'll only be happy again if I find another good job
B I can be happy whether I get another good job or not
12. Does being outgoing affect your happiness?
A. I would be happier if I was more outgoing.
B. I would be about as happy as I am right now if I was more outgoing
13. Think about the things in your life that you really want but just can't get. Maybe you want to
be a doctor, but you realize that your qualifications are not going to be good enough. Or
maybe you want to go out with a certain person, but that person won't go out with you.
How does this affect your happiness?
A. The more things I want but can't get, the less happy I am.
B. Wanting things I can't get does not make me less happy.
TOTAL
Score max = 13
(previous classification 0-6 non-linker; 7-13 linker)
APPENDIX 7
The Short Response Styles Questionnaire
(Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson, 2001)
SHORT RESPONSE STYLES QUESTIONNAIRE
Code: Date:
INSTRUCTIONS: People think and do many different things when they feel sad, blue or depressed. Please
read / listen to each of the items below and indicate whether you never, sometimes, often, or always think or
do each one when you feel sad, down or depressed. Please indicate what you generally do, not what you
think you should do.
1. I think about how alone I feel
(Please Circle)
Never Sometimes Often Always
12 3 4










4. I think about how passive and unmotivated I feel
Never Sometimes Often Always
12 34
5. I think "why can't I get going?"
Never Sometimes Often Always
12 3 4
Never Sometimes
6. I think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better 1 2
Often Always
3 4





Never Sometimes Often Always
8. I think about all my shortcomings, failings, faults and 12 3 4
mistakes.
9. I think about how I don't feel up to doing anything
Never Sometimes Often Always
12 3 4







The Survey ofRecent Life Experiences
(SRLE, Kohn & Macdonald, 1992)
Code:
SURVEY OF RECENT LIFE EXPERIENCES (SRLE)
Date:
INSTRUCTIONS: Following is a list of experiences which many people have at some time or other. Please
indicate for each experience how much it has been a part of your life over the past month. Put a "1" in the
space provided next to an experience if it was not at all part of your life over the past month (e.g. "trouble with
mother in law - 1"); put a "2" for an experience which was only slightly part of your life over that time; put a
"3" for an experience which was distinctly part of your life; and put a "4" for an experience which was very
much part of your life over the past month.
Intensity of Experience over Past Month
1 = not at all part of my life
2- only slightly part of my life
3= distinctly part of my life
4= very much part of my life
1. Disliking your daily activities
2. Disliking your work
3. Ethnic or racial conflict
4. Conflicts with in-laws or boyfriend's/girlfriend's family
5. Being let down or disappointed by friends
6. Conflict with supervisor(s) at work
7. Social rejection
8. Too many things to do at once
9. Being taken for granted
10. Financial conflicts with family members
11. Having your trust betrayed by a friend
12. Having your contributions overlooked
13. Struggling to meet your own standards of performance and accomplishment
14. Being taken advantage of
15. Not enough leisure time
16. Cash-flow difficulties
17. A lot of responsibilities
18. Dissatisfaction with work
19. Decisions about intimate relationships
20. Not enough time to meet your obligations
21. Financial burdens
22. Lower evaluation of your work than you think you deserve
23. Experiencing high levels of noise
24. Lower evaluation of your work than you hoped for
25. Conflicts with family member(s)
26. Finding your work too demanding
27. Conflicts with friend(s)
28. Trying to secure a loan
29. Getting "ripped off' or cheated in the purchase of goods
30. Unwanted interruptions of your work
31. Social isolation
32. Being ignored
33. Dissatisfaction with your physical appearance
34. Unsatisfactory housing conditions
35. Finding work uninteresting
36. Failing to get money you expected
37. Gossip about someone you care about
38. Dissatisfaction with your physical fitness
39. Gossip about yourself
40. Difficulty dealing with modern technology (e.g. computers)
41. Hard work to look after and maintain house
TOTAL (41-164)
APPENDIX 9
The condensed version of the Social Readjustment Rating Scale (Life
Change List)
(SRRS, Holmes & Rahe, 1967)
123
SOCIAL READJUSTMENT RATING SCALE (SRRS - SHORT FORM)
Code: Date:
INSTRUCTIONS: Below is a list of events - major life changes that many people sometimes experience.
Please indicate (yes or no) if you have experienced each change in the last 2 years (24 months). The list
refers to changes or life events rather than long term difficulties. If the event occurred, please also rate how it
affected you on the following scale:-
1= Affected me in a very positive way (e.g. "complete happiness")
2= Affected me in a clearly positive way (e.g. "made me happy")
3= Affect on me was neutral, neither negative or positive (e.g. "felt indifferent")
4= Affected me in a clearly negative way (e.g. "made me unhappy")
5= Affected me in a very negative way (e.g. "disaster / very unhappy")
Life Event Scaled score Yes / no Impact on life
Conflict with spouse / (partner)
(e.g. lot more arguments)
35 1 2 3 4 5
Conflict with close relative or friend 29 1 2 3 4 5
Illness / accident in spouse / (partner) 44 1 2 3 4 5
Death of spouse (partner) 100 1 2 3 4 5
Death of a close relative or friend (circle) 63 or 37 1 2 3 4 5
Deteriorated financial situation 38 1 2 3 4 5
Conflict at work 23 1 2 3 4 5
Marital Separation 65 1 2 3 4 5
Started marital relationship 50 1 2 3 4 5
Residential move 20 1 2 3 4 5
New child (adoption or birth) 39 1 2 3 4 5
Change of Job 36 1 2 3 4 5
Reduced responsibility at work 29 1 2 3 4 5
Increased responsibility at work 29 1 2 3 4 5
TOTAL
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INSTRUCTIONS: I am going to read a list of ways you may have felt. Please tell me how often you have felt
this way during the past week: rarely or none of the time; some or a little of the time; occasionally or a
moderate amount of time; or most or all of the time.
During the past week, that would be Rarely Some Occasionally Most
from through today: (date) or or a or a or all
none of little of Moderate of the
the the amount of time
time time the (5-7
(less (1-2 time (2-4 days)
than 1 days) days)
a day)
1. You were bothered by things that usually don't 0 1 2 3
bother you.
2. You did not feel like eating; your appetite was 0 1 2 3
poor.
3. You felt that you could not shake off the blues 0 1 2 3
even with help from your family or friends.
4. You felt that you were just as good as other 3 2 1 0
people.
5. You had trouble keeping your mind on what you 0 1 2 3
were doing.
6. You felt depressed. 0 1 2 3
7. You felt that everything you did was an effort. 0 1 2 3
8. You felt hopeful about the future. 3 2 1 0
9. You thought your life had been a failure. 0 1 2 3
10. You felt fearful. 0 1 2 3
11. Your sleep was restless. 0 1 2 3
12. You were happy. 3 2 1 0
13. You talked less than usual. 0 1 2 3
14. You felt lonely. 0 1 2 3
15. People were unfriendly. 0 1 2 3
16. You enjoyed life. 3 2 1 0
17. You had crying spells. 0 1 2 3
18. You felt sad. 0 1 2 3
19. You felt that people disliked you. 0 1 2 3
20. You could not get "going". 0 1 2 3
To total: Add all circled numbers in each column
TOTAL:
APPENDIX 11
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale
(HADS, Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)
HADS
Code: Date:
INSTRUCTIONS: Read each item and underline the reply which comes closest to how you have been feeling
in the past week. Don't take too long over your replies, your immediate reaction to each item will probably be








1 feel tense or wound up
Most of the time
A lot of the time
From time to time, occasionally
Not at all
1 feel as if 1 am slowed down












1 still enjoy the things 1 used to enjoy
Definitely as much
Not quite so much
Only a little
Hardly at all
1 get a sort of frightened feeling like













I get a sort of frightened feeling as if
something awful is about to happen
Very definitely and quite badly
Yes, but not too badly
A little, but it doesn't worry me
Not at all
1 have lost interest in my appearance
Definitely
1 don't take as much care as 1 should
1 may not take quite as much care









1 can laugh and see the funny side of
things
As much as 1 always could
Not quite so much now
Definitely not so much now
Not at all














Worrying thoughts go through my
mind
A great deal of the time
A lot of the time
Not too often
Very little
1 look forward with enjoyment to things
As much as 1 ever did
Rather less than 1 used to














Most of the time








































Measure Outcome / Scores
Screening question / SCID-D
Linking questionnaire Total : /13




Survey of Recent Life Experiences
SRLE (hassles)
Total: (41-164)














Would you like a summary of the findings of this study to be sent to you?
If yes please provide your name & postal address. This information will be stored
confidentially and separately from your questionnaires and interview information.
Name:
Address:
post code:
